demonstrated against Khrushchev's policy of de-Stalinization. Long afterward many Stalin monuments and place-names—as well as the museum constructed at Stalin's birthplace in the town of Gori, northwest of Tbilisi—were maintained. Only with Mikhail S. Gorbachev's policy of *glasnost* (see Glossary) in the late 1980s did criticism of Stalin become acceptable and a full account of Stalin's crimes against his fellow Georgians become known in Georgia.

Between 1955 and 1972, Georgian communists used decentralization to become entrenched in political posts and to reduce further the influence of other ethnic groups in Georgia. In addition, enterprising Georgians created factories whose entire output was "off the books" (see The Underground Economy, this ch.). In 1972 the long-standing corruption and economic inefficiency of Georgia's leaders led Moscow to sponsor Eduard Shevardnadze as first secretary of the Georgian Communist Party. Shevardnadze had risen through the ranks of the Communist Youth League (Komsomol) to become a party first secretary at the district level in 1961. From 1964 until 1972, Shevardnadze oversaw the Georgian police from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, where he made a reputation as a competent and incorruptible official.

The First Shevardnadze Period

As party first secretary, Shevardnadze used purges to attack the corruption and chauvinism for which Georgia's elite had become infamous even among the corrupt and chauvinistic republics of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, a small group of dissident nationalists coalesced around academician Zviad Gamsakhurdia, who stressed the threat that Russification presented to the Georgian national identity. This theme would remain at the center of Georgian-Russian relations into the new era of Georgian independence in the 1990s. Soviet power and Georgian nationalism clashed in 1978 when Moscow ordered revision of the constitutional status of the Georgian language as Georgia's official state language. Bowing to pressure from street demonstrations, Moscow approved Shevardnadze's reinstatement of the constitutional guarantee the same year.

In the 1970s and early 1980s, Shevardnadze successfully walked a narrow line between the demands of Moscow and the Georgians' growing desire for national autonomy. He maintained political and economic control while listening carefully to popular demands and making strategic concessions. She-

vardnadze dealt with nationalism and dissent by explaining his policies to hostile audiences and seeking compromise solutions. The most serious ethnic dispute of Shevardnadze's tenure arose in 1978, when leaders of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic threatened to secede from Georgia, alleging unfair cultural, linguistic, political, and economic restrictions imposed by Tbilisi. Shevardnadze took a series of steps to diffuse the crisis, including an affirmative action program that increased the role of Abkhazian elites in running "their" region, despite the minority status of their group in Abkhazia.

Shevardnadze initiated experiments that foreshadowed the economic and political reforms that Gorbachev later introduced into the central Soviet system. The Abasha economic experiment in agriculture created new incentives for farmers similar to those used in the Hungarian agricultural reform of the time. A reorganization in the seaport of Poti expanded the role of local authorities at the expense of republic and all-union ministries. By 1980 Shevardnadze had raised Georgia's industrial and agricultural production significantly and had dismissed about 300 members of the party's corrupt hierarchy. When Shevardnadze left office in 1985, considerable government corruption remained, however, and Georgia's official economy was still weakened by an extensive illegal "second economy." But his reputation for honesty and political courage earned Shevardnadze great popularity among Georgians, the awarding of the Order of Lenin by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU—see Glossary) in 1978, and appointment as minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union in 1985.

Patiashvili

Jumber Patiashvili, a nondescript party loyalist, succeeded Shevardnadze as head of the Georgian Communist Party. Under Patiashvili, most of Shevardnadze's initiatives atrophied, and no new policy innovations were undertaken. Patiashvili removed some of Shevardnadze's key appointees, although he could not dismiss his predecessor's many middle-echelon appointees without seriously damaging the party apparatus.

In dealing with dissent, Patiashvili, who distrusted radical and unofficial groups, returned to the usual confrontational strategy of Soviet regional party officials. The party head met major resistance when he backed a plan for a new Transcaucasian railroad that would cut a swath parallel to the Georgian Military Highway in a historic, scenic, and environmentally sig-

nificant region. In a televised speech, Patiashvili called opponents of the project "enemies of the people"—a phrase used in the 1930s to justify liquidation of Stalin's real and imagined opponents. By isolating opposition groups, Patiashvili forced reformist leaders into underground organizations and confrontational behavior.

After Communist Rule

In Georgia, Gorbachev's simultaneous policies of *glasnost* and continued control energized the forces of nationalism, which pushed the republic out of the central state before the Soviet Union fell apart. The first years of independence were marked by struggle among Georgians for control of the government and by conflict with ethnic minorities seeking to escape the control of Tbilisi.

Nationalism Rises

In April 1989, Soviet troops broke up a peaceful demonstration at the government building in Tbilisi. Under unclear circumstances, twenty Georgians, mostly women and children, were killed. The military authorities and the official media blamed the demonstrators, and opposition leaders were arrested. The Georgian public was outraged. What was afterward referred to as the April Tragedy fundamentally radicalized political life in the republic. Shevardnadze was sent to Georgia to restore calm. He arranged for the replacement of Patiashvili by Givi Gumbaridze, head of the Georgian branch of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti—KGB).

In an atmosphere of renewed nationalist fervor, public opinion surveys indicated that the vast majority of the population was committed to immediate independence from Moscow. Although the communist party was discredited, it continued to control the formal instruments of power. In the months following the April Tragedy, the opposition used strikes and other forms of pressure to undermine communist power and set the stage for de facto separation from the Soviet Union.

The Rise of Gamsakhurdia

Partly as a result of the conspiratorial nature of antigovernment activity prior to 1989, opposition groups tended to be small, tightly knit units organized around prominent individuals. The personal ambitions of opposition leaders prevented



Old salt baths and Narikala Fortress, Tbilisi
Courtesy Michael W. Serafin

Old Tbilisi seen from Mtkvari (Kura) River
Courtesy Monica O'Keefe, United States Information Agency

the emergence of a united front, but Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the most widely honored and recognized of the nationalist dissidents, moved naturally to a position of leadership. The son of Georgia's foremost contemporary novelist, Gamsakhurdia had gained many enemies during the communist years in acrimonious disputes and irreconcilable factional splits.

Opposition pressure resulted in a multiparty election in October 1990. Despite guarantees written into the new law on elections, many prominent opposition parties boycotted the vote, arguing that their groups could not compete fairly and that their participation under existing conditions would only legitimize continuation of Georgia's "colonial status" within the Soviet system.

As an alternative, the opposition parties had held their own election, without government approval, in September 1990. Although the minimum turnout for a valid election was not achieved, the new "legislative" body, called the Georgian National Congress, met and became a center of opposition to the government chosen in the official October election. In the officially sanctioned voting, Gamsakhurdia's Round Table/Free Georgia coalition won a solid majority in the Supreme Soviet, Georgia's official parliamentary body.

Arguably the most virulently anticommunist politician ever elected in a Soviet republic, Gamsakhurdia was intolerant of all political opposition. He often accused his opposition of treason or involvement with the KGB. The quality of political debate in Georgia was lowered by the exchange of such charges between Gamsakhurdia and opposition leaders such as Gia Chanturia of the National Democratic Party.

After his election, Gamsakhurdia's greatest concern was the armed opposition. Both Gamsakhurdia's Round Table/Free Georgia coalition and some opposition factions in the Georgian National Congress had informal military units, which the previous, communist Supreme Soviet had legalized under pressure from informal groups. The most formidable of these groups were the Mkhedrioni (horsemen), said to number 5,000 men, and the so-called National Guard. The new parliament, dominated by Gamsakhurdia, outlawed such groups and ordered them to surrender their weapons, but the order had no effect. After the elections, independent military groups raided local police stations and Soviet military installations, sometimes adding formidable weaponry to their arsenals. In February 1991, a Soviet army counterattack against Mkhedri-

oni headquarters had led to the imprisonment of the Mkhedrioni leader.

Gamsakhurdia moved quickly to assert Georgia's independence from Moscow. He took steps to bring the Georgian KGB and Ministry of Internal Affairs (both overseen until then from Moscow) under his control. Gamsakhurdia refused to attend meetings called by Gorbachev to preserve a working union among the rapidly separating Soviet republics. Gamsakhurdia's communications with the Soviet leader usually took the form of angry telegrams and telephone calls. In May 1991, Gamsakhurdia ended the collection in Georgia of Gorbachev's national sales tax on the grounds that it damaged the Georgian economy. Soon Georgia ceased all payments to Moscow, and the Soviet government took steps to isolate the republic economically.

Rather than consent to participate in Gorbachev's March 1991 referendum on preserving a federation of Soviet republics, Gamsakhurdia organized a separate referendum on Georgian independence. The measure was approved by 98.9 percent of Georgian voters. On April 9, 1991, the second anniversary of the April Tragedy, the Georgian parliament passed a declaration of independence from the Soviet Union. Once the Soviet Union collapsed at the end of 1991, Georgia refused to participate in the formation or subsequent activities of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS—see Glossary), the loose confederation of independent republics that succeeded the Soviet Union.

The Struggle for Control

In May 1991, Gamsakhurdia was elected president of Georgia (receiving over 86 percent of the vote) in the first popular presidential election in a Soviet republic. Apparently perceiving the election as a mandate to run Georgia personally, Gamsakhurdia made increasingly erratic policy and personnel decisions in the months that followed, while his attitude toward the opposition became more strident. After intense conflict with Gamsakhurdia, Prime Minister Tengiz Sigua resigned in August 1991.

The August 1991 coup attempt against Gorbachev in Moscow marked a turning point in Georgian as well as in Soviet politics. Gamsakhurdia made it clear that he believed the coup, headed by the Soviet minister of defense and the head of the KGB, was both inevitable and likely to succeed. Accordingly, he

ordered Russian president Boris N. Yeltsin's proclamations against the coup removed from the streets of Tbilisi. Gamsakhurdia also ordered the National Guard to turn in its weapons, disband, and integrate itself into the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Opposition leaders immediately denounced this action as capitulation to the coup. In defiance of Gamsakhurdia, National Guard commander Tengiz Kitovani led most of his troops out of Tbilisi.

The opposition to Gamsakhurdia, now joined in an uneasy coalition behind Sigua and Kitovani, demanded that Gamsakhurdia resign and call new parliamentary elections. Gamsakhurdia refused to compromise, and his troops forcibly dispersed a large opposition rally in Tbilisi in September 1991. Chanturia, whose National Democratic Party was one of the most active opposition groups at that time, was arrested and imprisoned on charges of seeking help from Moscow to overthrow the government.

In the ensuing period, both the government and extraparliamentary opposition intensified the purchase and "liberation" of large quantities of weapons—mostly from Soviet military units stationed in Georgia—including heavy artillery, tanks, helicopter gunships, and armored personnel carriers. On December 22, intense fighting broke out in central Tbilisi after government troops again used force to disperse demonstrators. At this point, the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni besieged Gamsakhurdia and his supporters in the heavily fortified parliament building. Gunfire and artillery severely damaged central Tbilisi, and Gamsakhurdia fled the city in early January 1992 to seek refuge outside Georgia.

The Military Council

A Military Council made up of Sigua, Kitovani, and Mkhedrioni leader Jaba Ioseliani took control after Gamsakhurdia's departure. Shortly thereafter, a Political Consultative Council and a larger State Council were formed to provide more decisive leadership (see Government and Politics, this ch.). In March 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze returned to Georgia at the invitation of the Military Council. Shortly thereafter, Shevardnadze joined Ioseliani, Sigua, and Kitovani to form the State Council Presidium. All four were given the right of veto over State Council decisions.

Gamsakhurdia, despite his absence, continued to enjoy substantial support within Georgia, especially in rural areas and in

his home region of Mingrelia in western Georgia. Gamsakhurdia supporters now constituted another extraparliamentary opposition, viewing themselves as victims of an illegal and unconstitutional putsch and refusing to participate in future elections. Based in the neighboring Chechen Autonomous Republic of Russia, Gamsakhurdia continued to play a direct role in Georgian politics, characterizing Shevardnadze as an agent of Moscow in a neocommunist conspiracy against Georgia. In March 1992, Gamsakhurdia convened a parliament in exile in the Chechen city of Groznyy. In 1992 and 1993, his armed supporters prevented the Georgian government from gaining control of parts of western Georgia.

Threats of Fragmentation

The autonomous areas of South Ossetia and Abkhazia added to the problems of Georgia's post-Soviet governments. By 1993 separatist movements in those regions threatened to tear the republic into several sections. Intimations of Russian interference in the ethnic crises also complicated Georgia's relations with its giant neighbor.

South Ossetia

The first major crisis faced by the Gamsakhurdia regime was in the South Ossetian Autonomous Region, which is largely populated by Ossetians, a separate ethnic group speaking a language based on Persian (see Population and Ethnic Composition, this ch.). In December 1990, Gamsakhurdia summarily abolished the region's autonomous status within Georgia in response to its longtime efforts to gain independence. When the South Ossetian regional legislature took its first steps toward secession and union with the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic of Russia, Georgian forces invaded. The resulting conflict lasted throughout 1991, causing thousands of casualties and creating tens of thousands of refugees on both sides of the Georgian-Russian border. Yeltsin mediated a cease-fire in July 1992. A year later, the cease-fire was still in place, enforced by Ossetian and Georgian troops together with six Russian battalions. Representatives of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE—see Glossary) attempted mediation, but the two sides remained intractable. In July 1993, the South Ossetian government declared negotiations over and threatened to renew large-scale combat, but the cease-fire held through early 1994.

Church and fortress on Georgian Military Highway at Ananuri
Courtesy Gordon Snider

Abkhazia

In the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic of Georgia, the Abkhazian population, like the Ossetians a distinct ethnic group, feared that the Georgians would eliminate their political autonomy and destroy the Abkhaz as a cultural entity. On one hand, a long history of ill will between the Abkhaz and the Georgians was complicated by the minority status of the Abkhaz within the autonomous republic and by periodic Georgianization campaigns, first by the Soviet and later by the Georgian government. On the other hand, the Georgian majority in Abkhazia resented disproportionate distribution of political and administrative positions to the Abkhaz. Beginning in 1978, Moscow had sought to head off Abkhazian demands for independence by allocating as much as 67 percent of party and government positions to the Abkhaz, although, according to the 1989 census, 2.5 times as many Georgians as Abkhaz lived in Abkhazia.

Tensions in Abkhazia led to open warfare on a much larger scale than in South Ossetia. In July 1992, the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet voted to return to the 1925 constitution, under which Abkhazia was separate from Georgia. In August 1992, a force of the Georgian National Guard was sent to the Abkhazian capital of Sukhumi with orders to protect Georgian rail and road supply lines and to secure the border with Russia. When Abkhazian authorities reacted to this transgression of their self-proclaimed sovereignty, hundreds were killed in fighting between Abkhazian and Georgian forces, and large numbers of refugees fled across the border into Russia or into other parts of Georgia. The Abkhazian government was forced to flee Sukhumi.

For two centuries, the Abkhaz had viewed Russia as a protector of their interests against the Georgians; accordingly, the Georgian incursion of 1992 brought an Abkhazian plea for Russia to intervene and settle the issue. An unknown number of Russian military personnel and volunteers also fought on the side of the Abkhaz, and Shevardnadze accused Yeltsin of intentionally weakening Georgia's national security by supporting separatists. After the failure of three cease-fires, in September 1993 Abkhazian forces besieged and captured Sukhumi and drove the remaining Georgian forces out of Abkhazia. In the fall of 1993, mediation efforts by the United Nations (UN) and Russia were slowed by Georgia's struggle against Gamsakhurdia's forces in Mingrelia, south of Abkhazia. In early 1994,

a de facto cease-fire remained in place, with the Inguri River in northwest Georgia serving as the dividing line. Separatist forces made occasional forays into Georgian territory, however.

In September 1993, Gamsakhurdia took advantage of the struggle in Abkhazia to return to Georgia and rally enthusiastic but disorganized Mingrelians against the demoralized Georgian army. Although Gamsakhurdia initially represented his return as a rescue of Georgian forces, he actually included Abkhazian troops in his new advance. Gamsakhurdia's forces took several towns in western Georgia, adding urgency to an appeal by Shevardnadze for Russian military assistance. In mid-October the addition of Russian weapons, supply-line security, and technical assistance turned the tide against Gamsakhurdia and brought a quick end to hostilities on the Mingrelian front (see Foreign Relations, this ch.). His cause apparently lost, Gamsakhurdia committed suicide in January 1994.

Physical Environment

Georgia is a small country of approximately 69,875 square kilometers—about the size of West Virginia. To the north and northeast, Georgia borders the Russian republics of Chechnya, Ingushetia, and North Ossetia (all of which began to seek autonomy from Russia in 1992). Neighbors to the south are Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. The shoreline of the Black Sea constitutes Georgia's entire western border (see fig. 1).

Topography

Despite its small area, Georgia has one of the most varied topographies of the former Soviet republics (see fig. 2). Georgia lies mostly in the Caucasus Mountains, and its northern boundary is partly defined by the Greater Caucasus range. The Lesser Caucasus range, which runs parallel to the Turkish and Armenian borders, and the Surami and Imereti ranges, which connect the Greater Caucasus and the Lesser Caucasus, create natural barriers that are partly responsible for cultural and linguistic differences among regions. Because of their elevation and a poorly developed transportation infrastructure, many mountain villages are virtually isolated from the outside world during the winter. Earthquakes and landslides in mountainous areas present a significant threat to life and property. Among the most recent natural disasters were massive rock- and mudslides in Ajaria in 1989 that displaced thousands of people in southwestern Georgia, and two earthquakes in 1991 that

destroyed several villages in north-central Georgia and South Ossetia.

Georgia has about 25,000 rivers, many of which power small hydroelectric stations. Drainage is into the Black Sea to the west and through Azerbaijan to the Caspian Sea to the east. The largest river is the Mtkvari (formerly known by its Azerbaijani name, Kura, which is still used in Azerbaijan), which flows 1,364 kilometers from northeast Turkey across the plains of eastern Georgia, through the capital, Tbilisi, and into the Caspian Sea. The Rioni River, the largest river in western Georgia, rises in the Greater Caucasus and empties into the Black Sea at the port of Poti. Soviet engineers turned the river lowlands along the Black Sea coast into prime subtropical agricultural land, embanked and straightened many stretches of river, and built an extensive system of canals. Deep mountain gorges form topographical belts within the Greater Caucasus.

Climate

Georgia's climate is affected by subtropical influences from the west and mediterranean influences from the east. The Greater Caucasus range moderates local climate by serving as a barrier against cold air from the north. Warm, moist air from the Black Sea moves easily into the coastal lowlands from the west. Climatic zones are determined by distance from the Black Sea and by altitude. Along the Black Sea coast, from Abkhazia to the Turkish border, and in the region known as the Kolkhida Lowlands inland from the coast, the dominant subtropical climate features high humidity and heavy precipitation (1,000 to 2,000 millimeters per year; the Black Sea port of Batumi receives 2,500 millimeters per year). Several varieties of palm trees grow in these regions, where the midwinter average temperature is 5°C and the midsummer average is 22°C.

The plains of eastern Georgia are shielded from the influence of the Black Sea by mountains that provide a more continental climate. Summer temperatures average 20°C to 24°C, winter temperatures 2°C to 4°C. Humidity is lower, and rainfall averages 500 to 800 millimeters per year. Alpine and highland regions in the east and west, as well as a semiarid region on the Iori Plateau to the southeast, have distinct microclimates.

At higher elevations, precipitation is sometimes twice as heavy as in the eastern plains. In the west, the climate is subtropical to about 650 meters; above that altitude (and to the north and east) is a band of moist and moderately warm

weather, then a band of cool and wet conditions. Alpine conditions begin at about 2,100 meters, and above 3,600 meters snow and ice are present year-round.

Environmental Issues

Beginning in the 1980s, Black Sea pollution has greatly harmed Georgia's tourist industry. Inadequate sewage treatment is the main cause of that condition. In Batumi, for example, only 18 percent of wastewater is treated before release into the sea. An estimated 70 percent of surface water contains health-endangering bacteria, to which Georgia's high rate of intestinal disease is attributed.

The war in Abkhazia did substantial damage to the ecological habitats unique to that region. In other respects, experts considered Georgia's environmental problems less serious than those of more industrialized former Soviet republics. Solving Georgia's environmental problems was not a high priority of the national government in the post-Soviet years, however; in 1993 the minister of protection of the environment resigned to protest this inactivity. In January 1994, the Cabinet of Ministers announced a new, interdepartmental environmental monitoring system to centralize separate programs under the direction of the Ministry of Protection of the Environment. The system would include a central environmental and information and research agency. The Green Party used its small contingent in the parliament to press environmental issues in 1993.

Population and Ethnic Composition

Over many centuries, Georgia gained a reputation for tolerance of minority religions and ethnic groups from elsewhere, but the postcommunist era was a time of sharp conflict among groups long considered part of the national fabric. Modern Georgia is populated by several ethnic groups, but by far the most numerous of them is the Georgians. In the early 1990s, the population was increasing slowly, and armed hostilities were causing large-scale emigration from certain regions. The ethnic background of some groups, such as the Abkhaz, was a matter of sharp dispute.

Population Characteristics

According to the Soviet Union's 1989 census, the total popu-

lation of Georgia was 5.3 million. The estimated population in 1993 was 5.6 million. Between 1979 and 1989, the population grew by 8.5 percent, with growth rates of 16.7 percent among the urban population and 0.3 percent in rural areas. In 1993 the overall growth rate was 0.8 percent. About 55.8 percent of the population was classified as urban; Tbilisi, the capital and largest city, had more than 1.2 million inhabitants in 1989, or approximately 23 percent of the national total. The capital's population grew by 18.1 percent between 1979 and 1989, mainly because of migration from rural areas. Kutaisi, the second largest city, had a population of about 235,000.

In 1991 Georgia's birth rate was seventeen per 1,000 population, its death rate nine per 1,000. Life expectancy was sixty-seven years for males and seventy-five years for females. In 1990 the infant mortality rate was 196 per 10,000 live births. Average family size in 1989 was 4.1, with larger families predominantly located in rural areas. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Georgian population was aging slowly; the cohort under age nineteen shrank slightly and the cohort over sixty increased slightly as percentages of the entire population during that period. The Georgian and Abkhazian populations were the subjects of substantial international study by anthropologists and gerontologists because of the relatively high number of centenarians among them.

Ethnic Minorities

Regional ethnic distribution is a major cause of the problems Georgia faces along its borders and within its territory (see fig. 14). Russians, who make up the third largest ethnic group in the country (6.7 percent of the total population in 1989), do not constitute a majority in any district. The highest concentration of Russians is in Abkhazia, but the overall dispersion of the Russian population restricts political representation of the Russians' interests.

Azerbaijanis are a majority of the population in the districts of Marneuli and Bolnisi, south of Tbilisi on the Azerbaijan border, while Armenians are a majority in the Akhalkalaki, Ninotsminda, and Dmanisi districts immediately to the west of the Azerbaijani-dominated regions and just north of the Armenian border. Despite the proximity and intermingling of Armenian and Azerbaijani populations in Georgia, in the early 1990s few conflicts in Georgia reflected the hostility of the Armenian and Azerbaijani nations over the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh

(see Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence, ch. 1; National Security, ch. 2). Organizations in Georgia representing the interests of the Armenian and Azerbaijani populations had relatively few conflicts with authorities in Tbilisi in the first post-communist years.

Under Soviet rule, a large part of Georgian territory was divided into autonomous areas that included concentrations of non-Georgian peoples. The largest such region was the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Abkhazian ASSR); after Georgian independence, it was redesignated the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic. The distribution of territory and the past policies of tsarist and Soviet rule meant that in 1989 the Abkhaz made up only 17.8 percent of the population of the autonomous republic named for them (compared with 44 percent Georgians and 16 percent Russians). The Abkhaz constituted less than 2 percent of the total population of Georgia. Although Georgian was the prevailing language of the region as early as the eighth century A.D., Abkhazia was an autonomous republic of Russia from 1921 until 1930, when it was incorporated into Georgia as an autonomous republic.

In the thirteenth century, Ossetians arrived on the south side of the Caucasus Mountains, in Georgian territory, when the Mongols drove them from what is now the North Ossetian Autonomous Republic of Russia. In 1922 the South Ossetian Autonomous Region was formed within the new Transcaucasian republic of the Soviet Union. The autonomous region was abolished officially by the Georgian government in 1990, then reinstated in 1992. South Ossetia includes many all-Georgian villages, and the Ossetian population is concentrated in the cities of Tskhinvali and Java. Overall, in the 1980s the population in South Ossetia was 66 percent Ossetian and 29 percent Georgian. In 1989 more than 60 percent of the Ossetian population of Georgia lived outside South Ossetia.

The Ajarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (Ajarian ASSR) in southwest Georgia was redesignated the Ajarian Autonomous Republic in 1992. The existence of that republic reflects the religious and cultural differences that developed when the Ottoman Empire occupied part of Georgia in the sixteenth century and converted the local population to Islam. The Ajarian region was not included in Georgia until the Treaty of Berlin separated it from the Ottoman Empire in 1878. An autonomous republic within Georgia was declared in 1921. Because the Ajarian population is indistinguishable from



Figure 14. Ethnic Groups in Georgia

the Georgian population in language and belongs to the same ethnic group, it generally considers itself Georgian. Eventually, the term "Ajarian" was dropped from the ethnic categories in the Soviet national census. Thus, in the 1979 census the ethnic breakdown of the region showed about 80 percent Georgians (including Ajars) and 10 percent Russians. Nevertheless, the autonomous republic remains an administrative subdivision of the Republic of Georgia, local elites having fought hard to preserve the special status that this distinction affords them.

The so-called Meskhetian Turks are another potential source of ethnic discord. Forcibly exiled from southern Georgia to Uzbekistan by Stalin during World War II, many of the estimated 200,000 Meskhetian Turks outside Georgia sought to return to their homes in Georgia after 1990. Many Georgians

argued that the Meskhetian Turks had lost their links to Georgia and hence had no rights that would justify the large-scale upheaval that resettlement would cause. However, Shevardnadze argued that Georgians had a moral obligation to allow this group to return.

Within the leading ethnic groups, the fastest growth between 1979 and 1989 occurred in the Azerbaijani population and among the Kurds (see Glossary), whose numbers increased by 20 percent and 30 percent, respectively. This trend worried Georgians, even though both groups combined made up less than 7 percent of the republic's population. Over the same period, the dominant Georgians' share of the population increased from 68.8 percent to 70.1 percent. Ethnic shifts after 1989—particularly the emigration of Russians, Ukrainians, and Ossetians—were largely responsible for the Georgians' increased share of the population.

Language, Religion, and Culture

For centuries, Georgia's geographic position has opened it to religious and cultural influences from the West, Persia, Turkey, and Russia. The resultant diversity continues to characterize the cultural and religious life of modern Georgia. However, the Georgian language displays unique qualities that cannot be attributed to any outside influence.

Language

Even more than religion, the issue of language was deeply entwined with political struggles in Georgia under communist rule. As elsewhere, language became a key factor in ethnic self-identification under the uniformity of the communist system. Written in a unique alphabet that began to exhibit distinctions from the Greek alphabet in the fifth century A.D., Georgian is linguistically distant from Turkic and Indo-European languages. In the Soviet period, Georgians fought relentlessly to prevent what they perceived as the encroachment of Russian on their native language. Even the republic's Soviet-era constitutions specified Georgian as the state language. In 1978 Moscow failed to impose a constitutional change giving Russian equal status with Georgian as an official language when Shevardnadze yielded to mass demonstrations against the amendment (see Within the Soviet Union, this ch.). Nevertheless, the Russian language predominated in official documents and communications from the central government. In 1991 the

Gamsakhurdia government reestablished the primacy of Georgian, to the dismay of minorities that did not use the language. In 1993 some 71 percent of the population used Georgian as their first language. Russian was the first language of 9 percent, Armenian of 7 percent, and Azerbaijani of 6 percent.

Religion

The wide variety of peoples inhabiting Georgia has meant a correspondingly rich array of active religions. The dominant religion is Christianity, and the Georgian Orthodox Church is by far the largest church. The conversion of the Georgians in A.D. 330 placed them among the first peoples to accept Christianity. According to tradition, a holy slave woman, who became known as Saint Nino, cured Queen Nana of Iberia of an unknown illness, and King Marian III accepted Christianity when a second miracle occurred during a royal hunting trip. The Georgians' new faith, which replaced Greek pagan and Zoroastrian beliefs, was to place them permanently on the front line of conflict between the Islamic and Christian worlds. As was true elsewhere, the Christian church in Georgia was crucial to the development of a written language, and most of the earliest written works were religious texts. After Georgia was annexed by the Russian Empire, the Russian Orthodox Church took over the Georgian church in 1811. The colorful frescoes and wall paintings typical of Georgian cathedrals were whitewashed by the Russian occupiers.

The Georgian church regained its autonomy only when Russian rule ended in 1918. Neither the Georgian Menshevik government nor the Bolshevik regime that followed considered revitalization of the Georgian church an important goal, however. Soviet rule brought severe purges of the Georgian church hierarchy and constant repression of Orthodox worship. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, many churches were destroyed or converted into secular buildings. This history of repression encouraged the incorporation of religious identity into the strong nationalist movement in twentieth-century Georgia and the quest of Georgians for religious expression outside the official, government-controlled church. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, opposition leaders, especially Zviad Gamsakhurdia, criticized corruption in the church hierarchy. When Ilia II became the patriarch (catholicos) of the Georgian Orthodox Church in the late 1970s, he brought order and a new morality to church affairs, and Georgian Orthodoxy experienced a revival.

His Holiness Ilia II, Patriarch of Mtskheta and All Georgia, leader of Georgian Orthodox Church
Courtesy Janet A. Koczak

In 1988 Moscow permitted the patriarch to begin consecrating and reopening closed churches, and a large-scale restoration process began. In 1993 some 65 percent of Georgians were Georgian Orthodox, 11 percent were Muslim, 10 percent Russian Orthodox, and 8 percent Armenian Apostolic.

Non-Orthodox religions traditionally have received tolerant treatment in Georgia. Jewish communities exist throughout the country, with major concentrations in the two largest cities, Tbilisi and Kutaisi. Azerbaijani groups have practiced Islam in Georgia for centuries, as have the Abkhazian and Ajarian groups concentrated in their respective autonomous republics. The Armenian Apostolic Church, whose doctrine differs in some ways from that of Georgian Orthodoxy, has autocephalous status.

The Arts

In many art forms, Georgia has a tradition spanning millennia. The golden age of the Georgian Empire (early twelfth century to early thirteenth century) was the time of greatest development in many forms, and subsequent centuries of occupation and political domination brought decline or dilution. Folk music and dance, however, remain an important part of Georgia's unique culture, and Georgians have made significant contributions to theater and film in the late twentieth century.

Literature

Among literary works written in Georgian, Shota Rustaveli's long poem *The Knight in the Panther Skin* occupies a unique position as the Georgian national epic. Supposedly Rustaveli was a government official during Queen Tamar's reign (1184–1212), late in the golden age. In describing the questing adventures of three hero-knights, the poem includes rich philosophical musings that have become proverbs in Georgian. Even during communist rule, the main street of the Georgian capital was named after Rustaveli.

Architecture

Starting in its earliest days, Georgia developed a unique architectural style that is most visible in religious structures dating as far back as the sixth century A.D. The cupola structure typical of Georgian churches probably was based on circular domestic dwellings that existed as early as 3000 B.C. Roman, Greek, and Syrian architecture also influenced this style. Persian occupation added a new element, and in the nineteenth century Russian domination created a hybrid architectural style visible in many buildings in Tbilisi. The so-called Stalinist architecture of the mid-twentieth century also left its mark on the capital.

Painting, Sculpture, and Metalworking

Like literature, Georgian mural painting reached its zenith during the golden age of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Featuring both religious and secular themes, many monuments of this and the later Byzantine- and Persian-influenced periods were destroyed by the Russians in the nineteenth century. Examples of Georgian religious painting remain in some of the old churches. Stone carving and metalworking traditions had developed in antiquity, when Roman and Greek techniques were incorporated. In the golden age, sculpture was applied most often to the outside of buildings. In the twentieth century, several Georgian sculptors have gained international recognition. Among them is Elguja Amasukheli, whose monuments are landmarks in Tbilisi. Metalworking was well established in the Caucasus among the ancestors of the Georgians as early as the Bronze Age (second millennium B.C.). This art form, applied to both religious and secular subjects, declined in the Middle Ages.

Music and Dance

Georgia is known for its rich and unique folk dance and music. The Georgian State Dance Company, founded in the 1940s, has traveled around the world performing spectacular renditions of traditional Georgian dances. Unique in folk-dancing tradition, Georgian male performers dance on their toes without the help of special blocked shoes. Georgian folk music, featuring complex, three-part, polyphonic harmonies, has long been a subject of special interest among musicologists. Men and women sing in separate ensembles with entirely different repertoires. Most Georgian folk songs are peculiar to individual regions of Georgia. The inspiration is most often the church, work in the fields, or special occasions. The Rustavi Choir, formed in 1968, is the best known Georgian group performing a traditional repertoire.

In modern Georgia, folk songs are most frequently sung around the table. The ceremonial dinner (*supra*), a frequent occurrence in Georgian homes, is a highly ritualized event that itself forms a direct link to Georgia's past. On such occasions, rounds of standardized and improvised toasts typically extend long into the night. Georgian cuisine, which includes a variety of delicate sauces and sharp spices, is also an important part of the culture that links the generations. In the Soviet period, the best restaurants in the large cities of other republics were often Georgian.

Film and Theater

In the postwar era, Georgian filmmaking and theater developed an outstanding reputation in the Soviet Union. Several Georgian filmmakers achieved international recognition in this period. Perhaps the single most important film of the *perestroika* (see Glossary) period was Tengiz Abuladze's *Repentance.* This powerful work, which won international acclaim when released in 1987, showed the consequences of Stalin's Great Terror of the 1930s through a depiction of the reign of a fictional local dictator. In 1993, despite chaotic political conditions, Tbilisi hosted the Golden Eagle Film Festival of the Black Sea Basin Countries, Georgia's first international film festival. Georgians also excel in theater. The Tbilisi-based Rustaveli Theater has been acclaimed internationally for its stagings (in Georgian) of the works of William Shakespeare and German dramatist Bertolt Brecht.

Education, Health, and Welfare

In 1992 Georgia retained the basic structure of education, health, and social welfare programs established in the Soviet era, although major reforms were being discussed. Georgia's requests for aid from the West have included technical assistance in streamlining its social welfare system, which heavily burdens the economy and generally fails to help those in greatest need.

Education

In the Soviet era, the Georgian population achieved one of the highest education levels in the Soviet Union. In 1989 some 15.1 percent of adults in Georgia had graduated from a university or completed some other form of higher education. About 57.4 percent had completed secondary school or obtained a specialized secondary education. Georgia also had an extensive network of 230 scientific and research institutes employing more than 70,000 people in 1990. The Soviet system of free and compulsory schooling had eradicated illiteracy by the 1980s, and Georgia had the Soviet Union's highest percentage of residents with a higher or specialized secondary education.

During Soviet rule, the CPSU controlled the operation of the Georgian education system. Theoretically, education was inseparable from politics, and the schools were deemed an important tool in remaking society along Marxist-Leninist lines. Central ministries for primary and secondary education and for higher and specialized education transmitted policy decisions to the ministries in the republics for implementation in local and regional systems. Even at the local level, most administrators were party members. The combination of party organs and government agencies overseeing education at all levels formed a huge bureaucracy that made significant reform impossible. By the mid-1980s, an education crisis was openly recognized everywhere in the Soviet Union.

In the early 1990s, Soviet education institutions were still in place in Georgia, although Soviet-style political propaganda and authoritarian teaching methods gradually disappeared. Most Georgian children attended general school (grades one to eleven), beginning at age seven. In 1988 some 86,400 students were enrolled in Georgia's nineteen institutions of higher learning. Universities are located in Batumi, Kutaisi, Sukhumi, and Tbilisi. In the early 1990s, private education

Elementary school children in English class, Children's Palace, Tbilisi
Courtesy Janet A. Koczak

institutes began to appear. Higher education was provided almost exclusively in Georgian, although 25 percent of general classes were taught in a minority language. Abkhazian and Ossetian children were taught in their native language until fifth grade, when they began instruction in Georgian or Russian.

Health

The Soviet system of health care, which embraced all the republics, included extensive networks of state-run hospitals, clinics, and emergency first aid stations. The huge government health bureaucracy in Moscow set basic policies for the entire country, then transmitted them to the health ministries of the republics. In the republics, programs were set up by regional and local health authorities. The emphasis was on meeting national standards and quotas for patient visits, treatments pro-

vided, and hospital beds occupied, with little consideration of regional differences or requirements.

Under this system, the average Georgian would go first to one of the polyclinics serving all the residents of a particular area. In the mid-1980s, polyclinics provided about 90 percent of medical care, offering very basic diagnostic services. In addition, most workplaces had their own clinics, which minimized time lost from work for medical reasons. The hospital system provided more complex diagnosis and treatment, although overcrowding often resulted from the admission of patients with minor complaints. Crowding was exacerbated by official standards requiring hospital treatment of a certain duration for every type of complaint.

The Soviet system placed special emphasis on treatment of women and children; many specialized treatment, diagnostic, and advanced-study centers offered pediatric, obstetric, and gynecological care. Maternity services and prenatal care were readily accessible. Emergency first aid was provided by specialized ambulance teams, most of which had only very basic equipment. Severe cases went to special emergency hospitals because regular hospitals lacked emergency rooms. Although this system worked efficiently in urban centers such as Tbilisi, it did not reach remote areas. Most Georgians cared for elderly family members at home, and nursing care was generally mediocre. Georgian health spas were a vital part of the Soviet Union's well-known sanatorium system, access to which was a privilege of employment in most state enterprises.

When the Soviet Union dissolved, it left a legacy of health problems to the respective republics, which faced the necessity of organizing separate health systems under conditions of scarce resources. By 1990 the Soviet health system had become drastically underfunded, and the incidence of disease and accidents was increased by poor living standards and environmental hazards. Nominally equal availability of medical treatment and materials was undermined by the privileged status of elite groups that had access to the country's best medical facilities. In 1990 the former republics also differed substantially in health conditions and availability of care (see table 2, Appendix). Subsequent membership in the Commonwealth of Independent States, to which Georgia committed itself in late 1993, did not affect this inequality.

According to most standard indicators, in 1991 the health and medical care of the Georgian population were among the

best in the Soviet Union. The rate at which tuberculosis was diagnosed, 28.9 cases per 100,000 population in 1990, was third lowest, and Georgia's 140.9 cancer diagnoses per 100,000 population in 1990 was the lowest rate among the Soviet republics. Georgia also led in physicians per capita, with 59.2 per 10,000 population, and in dentists per capita. However, hospital bed availability, 110.7 per 10,000 population in 1990, placed Georgia in the bottom half among Soviet republics, and infant mortality, 15.9 per 1,000 live births in 1990, was at the average for republics outside Central Asia.

Although illegal drugs were available and Georgia increasingly found itself on the international drug-trading route in the early 1990s, the drug culture was confined to a small percentage of the population. The relatively high rate of delinquency among Georgian youth, however, was frequently associated with alcohol abuse.

In 1993 the Republic AIDS and Immunodeficiency Center in Tbilisi reported that sixteen cases of acquired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS) had been detected; five victims were non-Georgians and were deported. Of the remaining eleven, two had contracted AIDS through drug use and one through a medical procedure. Despite the small number of cases, the AIDS epidemic has caused considerable alarm in the Georgian medical community, which formed a physicians' anti-AIDS association in 1993. The AIDS center, located in a makeshift facility in Tbilisi, conducts AIDS research and oversees testing in twenty-nine laboratories throughout Georgia, stressing efforts among high-risk groups.

As in other former Soviet republics, Georgia began devising health care reform strategies in 1992. Budget expenditures for health increased drastically once the Soviet welfare system collapsed. Theoretical elements of Georgian health reform were compulsory medical insurance, privatization and foreign investment in institutions providing health care, and stronger emphasis on preventive medicine. Little progress was made in the first two years of the reform process, however. In Georgia political instability and civil war have destroyed medical facilities while increasing the need for emergency care and creating a large-scale refugee problem (see Threats of Fragmentation, this ch.).

Social Security

In 1985 some 47 percent of Georgia's budget went to sup-

port the food, health, and education needs of the population. Social services included partial payment for maternity leave for up to eighteen months and unpaid maternity leave for up to three years. State pensions were automatic after twenty years of work for women and twenty-five years for men. As inflation rose in the postcommunist era, however, a large percentage of older Georgians continued working because their pensions could not support them. In 1991 the social security fund—supported mainly by a payroll tax—provided pensions for 1.3 million persons. The fund also paid benefits for sick leave and rest homes, as well as allowances for families with young children.

In 1992 subsidies were in place for basic commodities, pensions, unemployment benefits, and allowances for single mothers and children. At that time, a payroll tax of 3 percent was designated to support the national unemployment fund. Deficits in the social security fund were nominally covered by the state budget, but budget shortfalls elsewhere shifted that responsibility to the banking system. In 1992 increased benefit payments and the decision not to increase the payroll tax eroded the financial base of the fund.

The Economy

In the Soviet period, Georgia played an important role in supplying food products and minerals and as a center of tourism for the centralized state economy. However, the republic was also heavily dependent on imports to provide products vital to industrial support. In the post-Soviet years, the Georgian economy suffered a major decline because sources of those products were no longer reliable and because political instability limited the economic reorganization and foreign investment that might support an internationalized, free-market economy. The net material product(NMP—see Glossary) already had declined by 5 percent in 1989 and by 12 percent in 1990, after growing at an annual rate of 6 percent between 1971 and 1985. In late 1993, Shevardnadze reported that industrial production had declined by 60.5 percent in 1993 and that the annual inflation rate had reached 2,000 percent, largely as a result of the economic disruption caused by military conflict within Georgia's borders.

Conditions in the Soviet System

Georgian nationalists contended that Georgia's role in the "division of labor" among Soviet republics was unfairly assigned

and that other republics, especially Russia, benefited from the terms of trade set by Moscow. Georgian manganese, for example, went to Soviet steel plants at an extremely low price, and Georgian agricultural goods also sold at very low prices in other republics. At the same time, Georgia paid high prices for machinery and equipment purchased elsewhere in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe. Despite Georgia's popularity as a tourist destination, the republic reaped few benefits because most hard-currency earnings from tourism went to Moscow and because Soviet tourists paid little for their state-sponsored "vacation packages." Georgia benefited, however, from energy prices that were far below world market levels.

Despite the ambiguities of official statistics, all evidence indicates that after 1989 Georgia experienced a disastrous drop in industrial output, real income, consumption, capital investment, and virtually every other economic indicator. For example, official statistics showed a decline in national income of 34 percent in 1992 from 1985 levels.

Obstacles to Development

Several noneconomic factors influenced the broad decline of the Georgian economy that began before independence was declared in 1991. National liberation leaders used strikes in 1989 and 1990 to gain political concessions from the communist leadership; a 1990 railroad strike, for instance, paralyzed most of the Georgian economy. In 1991 the Gamsakhurdia government ordered strikes at enterprises subordinated to ministries in Moscow as a protest against Soviet interference in South Ossetia (see Ethnic Minorities, this ch.).

Although combat in Georgia in the period after 1991 left most of the republic unscathed, the economy suffered greatly from military action. Railroad transport between Georgia and Russia was disrupted severely in 1992 and 1993 because most lines from Russia passed through regions of severe political unrest. Georgia's natural gas pipeline to the north entered Russia through South Ossetia and thus was subject to attack during the ethnic war that began in that region in late 1990. In western Georgia, Gamsakhurdia's forces and Abkhazian separatists often stopped trains or blew up bridges in 1992. As a result, supplies could only enter Georgia through the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi or over a circuitous route from Russia through Azerbaijan.

In both the Soviet and the post-Soviet periods, conflicts between Georgia and Moscow broke many vital links in the republic's economy. Official 1988 data showed imports to Georgia from other republics of more than 5.2 billion rubles and exports of more than 5.5 billion rubles. As a result of Gamsakhurdia's policies, goods destined for Russia were withheld by Georgian officials. The Soviet leadership, encouraged by conservative provincial leaders in the Russian regions bordering Georgia, responded with their own partial economic blockade of Georgia in late 1990 and 1991. All-union enterprises in Georgia stopped receiving most of their supplies from outside the republic. The strangling of energy resources forced much of Georgian industry to shut down in 1991.

The Underground Economy

Economic statistics for Georgia are difficult to evaluate for both the Soviet era and the post-Soviet period, primarily because of the country's large underground economy. Traditional Georgian familial and clan relations have intensified the economic corruption that infused the entire communist system. Local elites in the communist party joined with underground speculators and entrepreneurs to form an economic mafia. Repeated efforts to eradicate this phenomenon, including an aggressive effort by Shevardnadze in the early 1970s, apparently had little impact. In the postcommunist period, struggles for economic control among competing mafias have been an important part of the political conflict plaguing Georgia.

Wages and Prices

Until 1991 Georgia's price system and inflation rate generally coincided with those of the other Soviet republics. Under central planning, prices of state enterprise products were fixed by direct regulation, fixed markup rates, or negotiation at the wholesale level, with subsequent sanction by state authority. The prices of agricultural products from the private sector fluctuated freely in the Soviet system.

Once it forsook the artificial conditions of the Soviet system, Georgia faced the necessity for major changes in its pricing policy. Following the political upheaval of late 1991, which delayed price adjustments, the Georgian government raised the prices of basic commodities substantially in early 1992, to match adjustments made in most of the other former Soviet republics.

Jewelry-making and gun-repair stand in Tbilisi
Courtesy A. James Firth, United States Department of Agriculture

The price of bread, for example, rose from 0.4 ruble to 4.8 rubles per kilogram. By the end of 1992, all prices except those for bread, fuel, and transportation had been liberalized in order to avoid distortions and shortages. This policy brought steep inflation rates throughout 1993.

Beginning in 1991, a severe shortage of ruble notes restricted enterprises from acquiring enough currency to prevent a significant drop in real wages. In early 1992, public-sector wages were doubled, and every Georgian received an additional 40 rubles per month to compensate for the rising cost of living. Such compensatory increases were far below those in other former Soviet republics, however. In 1992 the Shevardnadze government considered wage indexing or regular adjustment of benefits to the lowest wage groups as a way of improving the public's buying power.

In mid-1993 the majority of Georgians still depended on state enterprises for their salaries, but in most cases some form of private income was necessary to live above the poverty level. Private jobs paid substantially more than state jobs, and the discrepancy grew larger in 1993. For example, in 1993 a secretary in a private company earned the equivalent of US$30 per month, while a state university professor made the equivalent of US$4 per month.

Banking, the Budget, and the Currency

In the spring of 1991, Georgian banks ended their relationship with parent banks in Moscow. The National Bank of Georgia was created in mid-1991 as an independent central national bank; its main function was to ensure the stability of the national currency, and it was not responsible for obligations incurred by the government. The National Bank also assumed all debts of Georgian banks to the state banks in Moscow.

In 1992 the national system included five specialized government commercial banks and sixty private commercial banks. The five government-owned commercial banks provided 95 percent of bank credit going to the economy. They included the Agricultural and Industrial Bank of Georgia, the Housing Bank of Georgia, and the Bank for Industry and Construction, which were the main sources of financing for state enterprises during this period. Private commercial banks, which began operation in 1989, grew rapidly in 1991–92 because of favorable interest rates; new banking laws were passed in 1991 to cover their activity.

Under communist rule, transfers from the Soviet national budget had enabled Georgia to show a budget surplus in most years. When the Soviet contribution of 751 million rubles—over 5 percent of Georgia's gross domestic product (GDP—see Glossary)—became unavailable in 1991, the Georgian government ran a budget deficit estimated at around 2 billion rubles. The destruction of government records during the Tbilisi hostilities of late 1991 left the new government lacking reliable information on which to base financial policy for 1992 and beyond (see After Communist Rule, this ch.).

In 1992 the government assumed an additional 2 billion to 3 billion rubles of unpaid debts from state enterprises, raising the deficit to between 17 and 21 percent of GDP (see table 17, Appendix). By May 1992, when the State Council approved a new tax system, the budget deficit was estimated at 6 billion to

7 billion rubles. The deficit was exacerbated by military expenditures associated with the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and by the cost of dealing with natural disasters.

The 1992 budget was restricted by a delay in the broadening of the country's tax base, the cost of assuming defense and security expenses formerly paid by the Soviet Union, the doubling of state wages, and the cost of earthquake relief in the north. When the 1993 budget was proposed, only 11 billion of the prescribed 43.6 billion rubles of expenditures were covered by revenues.

Tax reform in early 1992 added an excise tax on selected luxury items and a flat-rate value-added tax (VAT—see Glossary) on most goods and services, while abolishing the turnover and sales taxes of the communist system. In 1992 tax revenues fell below the expected level, however, because of noncompliance with new tax requirements; a government study showed that 80 percent of businesses underpaid their taxes in 1992.

In early 1993, Georgia remained in the "ruble zone," still using the Russian ruble as the official national currency. Efforts begun in 1991 to establish a separate currency convertible on world markets were frustrated by political and economic instability. Beginning in August 1993, the Central Bank of Russia began withdrawing ruble banknotes; a new unit, designated the coupon (for value of the coupon—see Glossary), became the official national currency after several months of provisional status. Rubles and United States dollars continued to circulate widely, however, especially in large transactions. After the National Bank of Georgia had established weekly exchange rates for two months, the coupon's exchange rate against the United States dollar inflated from 5,569 to 12,629. In September all salaries were doubled, setting off a new round of inflation. By October the rate had reached 42,000 coupons to the dollar.

Industry

In 1990 about 20 percent of Georgia's 1,029 industrial enterprises, including the largest, were directly administered by the central ministries of the Soviet Union. Until 1991 Georgian industry was integrated with the rest of the Soviet economy. About 90 percent of the raw materials used by Georgian light industry came from outside the republic. The Transcaucasian Metallurgical Plant at Rustavi and the Kutaisi Automotive

Works, as well as other centers of heavy industry, depended heavily on commercial agreements with the other Soviet republics. The Rustavi plant, for example, could not operate without importing iron ore, most of which it received (and continues to receive) from Azerbaijan. The Kutaisi works depended on other republics for raw materials, machinery, and spare parts. Georgia contributed significantly to Soviet mineral output, particularly of manganese (a component of steel alloy found in the Chiatura and Kutaisi regions in west-central Georgia) and copper.

In the late 1980s, Georgia's main industrial products were machine tools, prefabricated building structures, cast iron, steel pipe, synthetic ammonia, and silk thread. Georgian refineries also processed gasoline and diesel fuel from imported crude oil. Georgian industry made its largest contributions to the Soviet Union's total industrial production in wool fabric, chemical fibers, rolled ferrous metals, and metal-cutting machine tools (see table 18, Appendix).

Energy Resources

The lack of significant domestic fuel reserves made the Georgian economy extremely dependent on neighboring republics, especially Russia, to meet its energy needs. Under the fuel supply conditions of 1994, only further exploitation of hydroelectric power could enhance energy self-sufficiency. In 1990 over 95 percent of Georgia's fuel was imported. For that reason, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 caused an energy crisis and stimulated a search for alternative suppliers.

The harsh winter of 1991–92 increased fuel demand at a time when supply was especially limited. Oil imports were reduced by the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, cold weather curtailed domestic hydroelectric production, and the price of fuel and energy imports from other former Soviet republics rose drastically because of Georgia's independent political stance and the new economic realities throughout the former union. Beginning in December 1991, industries received only about one-third of the energy needed for full-scale operation, and most operated far below capacity throughout 1992.

Small amounts of oil were discovered in the Samgori region (southern Georgia) in the 1930s and in eastern Georgia in the 1970s, but no oil exploration has occurred in most of the republic. In 1993 some 96 percent of Georgia's oil came from

Hydroelectric station on Georgian Military Highway between Tbilisi and Mtskheta

Azerbaijan and Russia, although new supply agreements had been reached with Iran and Turkey. Oil and gas pipelines connect Georgia with Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, and Turkmenistan. Refinery and storage facilities in Batumi receive oil through a long pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan.

Coal is mined in Abkhazia and near Kutaisi, but between 1976 and 1991 output fell nearly 50 percent, to about 1 million tons. The largest deposits, both of which are in Abkhazia, are estimated to contain 250 million tons and 80 million tons, respectively. Domestic coal provides half the Rustavi plant's needs and fuels some electrical power generation. In 1993 natural gas, nearly all of which was imported, accounted for 44 percent of fuel consumption.

Georgia has substantial hydroelectric potential, only 14 percent of which was in use in 1993 in a network of small hydroelectric stations. In 1993 all but eight of Georgia's seventy-two power stations were hydroelectric, but together they provided only half the republic's energy needs. In the early 1990s, Georgia's total consumption of electrical energy exceeded domestic generation by as much as 30 percent. Georgian planners see further hydroelectric development as the best domestic solution to the country's power shortage.

Agriculture

Georgia's climate and soil have made agriculture one of its most productive economic sectors; the 18 percent of Georgian land that is arable provided 32 percent of the republic's NMP in 1990. In the Soviet period, swampy areas in the west were drained, and arid regions in the east were salvaged by a complex irrigation system, allowing Georgian agriculture to expand production tenfold between 1918 and 1980. Production was hindered in the Soviet period, however, by the misallocation of agricultural land (for example, the assignment of prime grain fields to tea cultivation) and excessive specialization. Georgia's emphasis on labor-intensive crops such as tea and grapes kept the rural work force at an unsatisfactory level of productivity. Some 25 percent of the Georgian work force was engaged in agriculture in 1990; 37 percent had been so engaged in 1970 (see table 19, Appendix). In the spring of 1993, sowing of spring crops was reduced by one-third on state land and by a substantial amount on private land as well because of fuel and equipment shortages. For the first half of 1993, overall agricultural production was 35 percent less than for the same period of 1992.

Land Redistribution

Until the land-privatization program that began in 1992, most Georgian farms were state-run collectives averaging 428 hectares in size. Even under Soviet rule, however, Georgia had a vigorous private agricultural sector. In 1990, according to official statistics, the private sector contributed 46 percent of gross agricultural output, and private productivity averaged about twice that of the state farms (see table 20, Appendix). Under the state system, designated plots were leased to farmers and town dwellers for private crop and livestock raising. As during the Soviet era, more than half of Georgia's meat and milk and nearly half of its eggs came from private producers.

As was the case with enterprise privatization, Gamsakhurdia postponed systematic land reform because he feared that local mafias would dominate the redistribution process. But within weeks of his ouster in early 1992, the new government issued a land reform resolution providing land grants of one-half hectare to individuals with the stipulation that the land be farmed. Commissions were established in each village to inventory land parcels and identify those to be privatized. Limitations were placed on what the new "owners" could do with their land, and

would-be private farmers faced serious problems in obtaining seeds, fertilizer, and equipment. By the end of 1993, over half the cultivated land was in private hands. Small plots were given free to city dwellers to relieve the acute food shortage that year.

Crop Distribution

In 1993 about 85 percent of cultivated land, excluding orchards, vineyards, and tea plantations, was dedicated to grains. Within that category, corn grew on 40 percent of the land, and winter wheat on 37 percent. The second most important agricultural product is wine. Georgia has one of the world's oldest and finest winemaking traditions; archaeological findings indicate that wine was being made in Georgia as early as 300 B.C. Some forty major wineries were operating in 1990, and about 500 types of local wines were made. The center of the wine industry is Kakhetia in eastern Georgia. Georgia is also known for the high quality of its mineral waters.

Other important crops are tea, citrus fruits, and noncitrus fruits, which account for 18.3 percent, 7.7 percent, and 8.4 percent of Georgia's agricultural output, respectively. Cultivation of tea and citrus fruits is confined to the western coastal area. Tea accounts for 36 percent of the output of the large food-processing industry, although the quality of Georgian tea dropped perceptibly under Soviet management in the 1970s and 1980s. Animal husbandry, mainly the keeping of cattle, pigs, and sheep, accounts for about 25 percent of Georgia's agricultural output, although high density and low mechanization have hindered efficiency.

Until 1991 other Soviet republics bought 95 percent of Georgia's processed tea, 62 percent of its wine, and 70 percent of its canned goods (see table 21; table 22, Appendix). In turn, Georgia depended on Russia for 75 percent of its grain. One-third of Georgia's meat and 60 percent of its dairy products were supplied from outside the republic. Failure to adjust these relationships contributed to Georgia's food crises in the early 1990s.

Transportation and Telecommunications

Georgia's location makes it an important commercial transit route, and the country inherited a well-developed transportation system when it became independent in 1991. However, lack of money and political unrest have cut into the system's maintenance and allowed it to deteriorate somewhat since

independence. Fighting in and around the secessionist Abkhazian Autonomous Republic in the northwest has isolated that area and also has cut some of the principal rail and highway links between Georgia and Russia.

In 1990 Georgia had 35,100 kilometers of roads, 31,200 kilometers of which were paved (see fig. 15). Since the nineteenth century, Tbilisi has been the center of the Caucasus region's highway system, a position reinforced during the Soviet era. The country's four principal highways radiate from Tbilisi roughly in the four cardinal directions. Route M27 extends west from the capital through the broad valley between the country's two main mountain ranges and reaches the Black Sea south of Sukhumi. The highway then turns northwest along the Black Sea to the Russian border. A secondary road, Route A305, branches off Route M27 and carries traffic to the port of Poti. Another secondary road runs south along the Black Sea coast from Poti to the port of Batumi. From Batumi a short spur of about ten kilometers is Georgia's only paved connection with Turkey.

Route A301, more commonly known as the Georgian Military Highway, runs north from Tbilisi across the Greater Caucasus range to Russia. The route was first described by Greek geographers in the first century B.C. and was the only land route north into Russia until the late 1800s. The route contains many hairpin turns and winds through several passes higher than 2,000 meters in elevation before reaching the Russian border. Heavy snows in winter often close the road for short periods. The country's other two main highways connect Tbilisi with the neighboring Transcaucasian countries. Route A310 runs south to Erevan, and Route A302 extends east across a lower portion of the Greater Caucasus range to Azerbaijan. All major routes have regular and frequent bus transport.

Georgia had 1,421 kilometers of rail lines in 1993, excluding several small industrial lines. In the early 1990s, most lines were 1.520-meter broad gauge, and the principal routes were electrified. The tsarist government built the first rail links in the region from Baku on the Caspian Sea through Tbilisi to Poti on the Black Sea in 1883; this route remains the principal rail route of Transcaucasia. Along the Black Sea, a rail route extends from the main east-west line into Russia, and two lines run south from Tbilisi—one to Armenia and the other to Azerbaijan. Spurs link these main routes with smaller towns in Georgia's broad central valley. Principal classification yards and

rail repair services are in Batumi and Tbilisi. Most rail lines provide passenger service, but in 1994 international passenger service was limited to the Tbilisi-to-Baku train. Because of fighting in Abkhazia, freight and passenger service to Russia has been suspended, with only the section from Tbilisi to the port of Poti still operative. Service on the Tbilisi-to-Erevan line has also been disrupted because the tracks pass through the area of armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Tbilisi was one of the first cities of the Soviet Union to have a subway system. The system consists of twenty-three kilometers of heavy rail lines, most of which are underground. Three lines with twenty stations radiate from downtown, with extensions either planned or under construction in 1994. The system is heavily used, and trains run at least every four minutes throughout the day. In 1985, the last year of available statistics, 145 million passengers were carried, about the same number of passengers that used Washington, D.C.'s Metrorail system in 1992.

Georgia's principal airport, Novoalekseyevka, is about eighteen kilometers northeast of downtown Tbilisi. With a runway approximately 2,500 meters long, the airport can accommodate airplanes as large as the Russian Tu–154, the Boeing 727, and the McDonnell Douglas DC–9. In 1993 the airport handled about 26,000 tons of freight. Orbis, the new state-run airline, provides service to neighboring countries, flights to several destinations throughout Russia, and direct service to some European capitals. Between 1991 and 1993, fuel shortages severely curtailed air passenger and cargo service, however. Eighteen other airports throughout the country have paved runways, but most are used for minor freight transport.

Georgia's Black Sea ports provide access to the Mediterranean Sea via the Bosporus. Georgia has two principal ports, at Poti and Batumi, and a minor port at Sukhumi. Although Batumi has a natural harbor, Poti's man-made harbor carries more cargo because of that city's rail links to Tbilisi. The port at Poti can handle ships having up to ten meters draught and 30,000 tons in weight. Altogether, nine berths can process as much as 100,000 tons of general cargo, 4 million tons of bulk cargo, and 1 million tons of grain per year. Facilities include tugboats, equipment for unloading tankers, a grain elevator, 22,000 square meters of covered storage area, and 57,000 square meters of open storage area. Direct onloading of containers to rail cars is available. The port primarily handles

Figure 15. Transportation System of Georgia, 1994

imports of general cargo and exports of grain, coal, and ores. Poti is ice-free, but in winter strong west winds can make entry into the port hazardous.

Batumi's natural port is located on a bay just northeast of the city. Eight alongside berths have a total capacity of 100,000 tons of general cargo, 800,000 tons of bulk cargo, and 6 million tons of petroleum products. Facilities include portal cranes, loaders for moving containers onto rail cars, 5,400 square meters of covered storage, and 13,700 square meters of open storage. The port lies at the end of the Transcaucasian pipeline from Baku and is used primarily for the export of petroleum and petroleum products. The port's location provides some protection from the winds that buffet Poti. However, strong winds can

cause dangerous currents in the port area, forcing ships to remain offshore until conditions improve.

Sukhumi, capital of the Abkhazian Autonomous Republic, is a small port that handles limited amounts of cargo, passenger ferries, and cruise ships. Imports consist mostly of building materials, and the port handles exports of local agricultural products, mostly fruit. Strong westerly and southwesterly winds make the port virtually unusable for long periods in the autumn and winter. Sukhumi has been unavailable to Georgia since Georgian forces abandoned the city during the conflict of the autumn of 1993.

In 1992 Georgia had 370 kilometers of crude oil pipeline, 300 kilometers of pipeline for refined petroleum products, and 440 kilometers of natural gas pipeline. Batumi is the terminus of a major oil pipeline that transports petroleum from Baku across the Caucasus for export. Two natural gas pipelines roughly parallel the route of the oil pipeline from Baku to Tbilisi before veering north along the Georgian Military Highway to Russia. Pipelines are generally high-capacity lines and have a diameter of either 1,020 or 1,220 millimeters.

Historically, Georgia was an important point on the Silk Road linking China with Europe. Since independence Georgians have discussed resuming this role by turning the republic into a modern transportation and communications hub. Such a plan might also make the republic a "dry Suez" for the transshipment of Iranian oil west across the Caucasus.

In 1991 about 672,000 telephone lines were in use, providing twelve lines per 100 persons. The waiting list for telephone installation was quite long in the early 1990s. Georgia is linked to the CIS countries and Turkey by overland lines, and one low-capacity satellite earth station is in operation. Three television stations, including the independent Iberia Television, and numerous radio stations broadcast in Georgian and Russian.

Economic Reform

Like all the former Soviet republics, Georgia recognized the need to restructure its economic system in the early 1990s, using national economic strengths to accommodate its own needs rather than the needs of central planners in Moscow. The road to reform has been full of obstacles, however: poor political leadership, the economic decline that began in the 1980s, civil war, and a well-established underground economy that is difficult to control.

Price Policy

Gamsakhurdia understood little about economics, and he postponed major economic reforms to avoid weakening his political position. In an effort to maintain popular support, he stabilized fares for public transportation and prices for basic consumer goods in state retail outlets (see table 22, Appendix). In March 1991, a new rationing system bound local residents to neighborhood shops. In April 1991, price controls were imposed in state stores. Price liberalization began only after Gamsakhurdia's departure as president, and it did not cover several basic consumer goods and services. Continued food subsidies were an additional factor contributing to the national budget deficit. In the interest of stimulating competition, a government decree removed restrictions on trade in May 1992, and at the same time taxes were eliminated on goods brought into Georgia. Persistent shortages of bread led the government to introduce ration cards for bread in December 1992. Under these conditions, inflation soared in private markets in 1991–92, although prices remained substantially lower than in Moscow for similar items.

In 1993 wholesale prices increased especially quickly under the influence of falling productivity. In the second half of 1993, the construction industry was hit hard by material cost increases of up to thirty times, although gasoline prices rose only gradually. The prices of heavy engineering and ferrous-metallurgy products rose by three to five times in the second half of 1993.

Enterprise Privatization

Another key element of economic reform, privatization of state enterprises, was stifled under Gamsakhurdia. He feared that the "economic mafia," which already owned a significant share of the nation's wealth, would use that wealth to accumulate state assets. Rapid growth had already occurred in the private retail sector, however, once cooperative enterprises began expanding in 1988. In 1990–91 privately run "commercial shops" began proliferating, often in place of state stores. Typically, these shops offered consumer goods brought from Turkey and resold at very high prices. The Law on Privatization of State Enterprises was adopted in August 1991 to outline general principles, and the Committee on Privatization was established in 1992. Under Shevardnadze, privatization began cautiously in August 1992 when the State Council adopted the

State Program on the Privatization of State Enterprises. The law copied Russia's approach to privatization by providing for several methods, including "popular privatization," consisting of a combination of vouchers distributed to the public and auctions of state enterprises. The country's political crises delayed meaningful measures, however. By 1993 few Georgian industries had been privatized, although large numbers of small enterprises were scheduled for privatization in 1993 and 1994.

Foreign Trade

In the Soviet period, Georgian trade with the world outside the Soviet Union was severely restricted by Moscow's foreign economic policy (see table 23, Appendix). Almost all of Georgian foreign economic activity was conducted by fourteen central enterprises, most of which operated under the direct management of Moscow. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Japan, and Poland were among the most important of Georgia's trading partners (see table 24, Appendix). Gamsakhurdia, suspicious of businessmen who sought to export Georgian goods, banned all export activity. The Shevardnadze government, however, created conditions for significant improvement of international investment and trade. In May 1992, licensing requirements for import or export activities were dropped except for the import of goods in the military and in medical categories. This change represented a significant expansion of the rights of enterprises to engage in foreign economic activity. Export of twelve commodities, mostly foodstuffs, was still prohibited at the end of 1992. Fees and other restrictions on the registration of joint ventures were removed, and the state tax on all imports was canceled. Import duties ranged from 5 to 55 percent, and export duties from 5 to 90 percent, with an exemption for former Soviet republics; the VAT on exports dropped to 14 percent in late 1992. The National Bank of Georgia imposed a tax of 12 percent on exporters' hard-currency earnings. In early 1993, new trade policies had not led to major increases in foreign trade and investment. Continued political instability, ethnic warfare, and extremely poor transportation and telecommunications facilities continued to discourage foreign investors in 1993.

In the second half of 1993, continued military upheaval did not entirely deter progress in foreign investment. The Renault automobile company of France, the German Tee Kanes tea company, and British and Dutch liquor companies signed con-

tracts in August, and officials of Mitsubishi and an American shipbuilder visited Georgia to assess investment conditions.

Government and Politics

In the late 1980s and the early 1990s, the tone of Georgian political life changed significantly. National elections held in 1989, 1990, and 1992 reflected that change. The nature of governance in newly independent Georgia was most influenced by the personalities of two men, Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Eduard Shevardnadze. But democratic institutions evolved slowly and sporadically in the early 1990s.

Establishing Democratic Institutions

Prior to the 1989 elections, the Georgian Communist Party maintained tight control over the nomination process. Even in 1989, candidates ran unopposed in forty-three of seventy-five races, and elsewhere pairings with opposition candidates were manipulated to guarantee results favoring the party. In Tbilisi grassroots movements succeeded in nominating three candidates to the Georgian Supreme Soviet in 1989. The leaders of these movements were mostly young intellectuals who had not been active dissidents. Many of those figures later joined to form a new political party, Democratic Choice for Georgia, abbreviated as DASi in Georgian. Because of expertise in local political organization, DASi played a leading role in drafting legislation for local and national elections between 1990 and 1992.

The death of the Tbilisi demonstrators in April 1989 led to a major change in the Georgian political atmosphere. Radical nationalists such as Gamsakhurdia were the primary beneficiaries of the national outrage following the April Tragedy. In his role as opposition leader, Gamsakhurdia formed a new political bloc in 1990, the Round Table/Free Georgia coalition.

In 1990 Georgia was the last Soviet republic to hold elections for the republic parliament. Protests and strikes against the election law and the nominating process had led to a six-month postponement of the elections until October 1990. Opposition forces feared that the political realities favored entrenched communist party functionaries and the enterprise and collective farm officials they had put in place. According to reports, about one-third of the 2,300 candidates for the Supreme Soviet fell into this category.



Communist-built secular wedding chapel, Tbilisi
Courtesy Michael W. Serafin

The electoral system adopted in August 1990, which represented a compromise between competing versions put forward by the Patiashvili government and the opposition, created the first truly multiparty elections in the Soviet Union. The new Georgian election law combined district-level, single-mandate, majority elections with a proportional party list system for the republic as a whole; a total of 250 seats would constitute the new parliament. On one hand, the proportional voting system required that a party gain at least 4 percent of the total votes to achieve representation in parliament. On the other hand, candidates with strong local support could win office even if their national totals fell below the 4 percent threshold. When the elections finally were held, widespread fears of violence or communist manipulation (expressed most vocally by Gamsakhurdia) proved unfounded.

The 1990 Election

The 1990 parliamentary election was a struggle between what remained of the Georgian Communist Party, which still held power at that point, and thirty-one opposition parties constituting the Georgian national movement. The national movement was not completely represented in the official election, however, because many opposition parties organized separate elections to an alternative body called the Georgian National Congress. An important factor in the results was a provision in the election law that forbade members of the communist party to run simultaneously on the ticket of another party. (By contrast, in this interim period other Soviet republics allowed even proponents of radical reform to retain their communist party memberships while representing popular fronts and similar organizations.)

The election decisively rejected the communists and gave a resounding popular mandate to the Round Table/Free Georgia bloc that Gamsakhurdia headed. That coalition captured 54 percent of the proportional vote to gain 155 seats out of the 250 up for election, while the communists gained 64 seats and 30 percent of the proportional vote. Communist strongholds remained in Azerbaijani and Armenian districts of southern Georgia. No other party reached the 4 percent share necessary for representation in the party-list system, and only a handful of candidates from other parties won victories in the individual district races. Boycotts prevented voting in two districts of Abkhazia and in two districts of South Ossetia.

Gamsakhurdia raised initial hopes for compromise in his new government by withdrawing Round Table/Free Georgia candidacies from runoffs against the opposition Popular Front Party in twelve races. That move ensured the election of Popular Front candidates as individuals in those contests; otherwise, the 4 percent rule would have precluded representation for the Popular Front.

The Gamsakhurdia Government

Gamsakhurdia's choice to head the new government, Tengiz Sigua, was almost universally praised. Sigua, formerly director of a metallurgy institute, had been an adroit and evenhanded deputy chairman of the Central Election Commission supervising the 1990 election. The government formed by Gamsakhurdia included many officials who lacked previous government

experience. Only one full minister was retained from the communist government, although former deputy ministers were frequently promoted to the top post in ministries concerned with the economy. Initially, the large number of remaining communist deputies formed no organized opposition bloc in the parliament. In fact, the communist party faded rapidly from the scene, and most of its property and publishing facilities were seized. The large, modern facility Shevardnadze had built for the party's Central Committee was taken over by the Cabinet of Ministers. The rapid decline of the communists showed that the major attraction of communist party membership had been the party's position of power; once that power was lost, the number of active communists dropped almost to zero. When the new first secretary of the party ran against Gamsakhurdia for president in 1991, he received less than 2 percent of the vote. After the August 1991 coup in Moscow, Gamsakhurdia banned the communist party, and deputies elected to parliament on the communist ticket were deprived of their seats.

Gamsakhurdia's Ouster and Its Aftermath

A small but vocal parliamentary opposition to Gamsakhurdia began to coalesce after August 1991, particularly after government forces reportedly fired on demonstrators in September. At this time, several of Gamsakhurdia's top supporters in the Round Table/Free Georgia bloc joined forces with the opposition. However, the opposition was unable to convince Gamsakhurdia to call new elections in late 1991. The majority of deputies, most of whom owed their presence in parliament to Gamsakhurdia, supported him to the end. Indeed, a significant number of deputies followed Gamsakhurdia into exile in Chechnya, where they continued to issue resolutions and decrees condemning the "illegal putsch."

In the aftermath of Gamsakhurdia's ouster in January 1992, parliament ceased to function, and an interim Political Consultative Council was formed. Its membership would include representatives of ten political parties, a select group of intellectuals, and several opposition members of parliament. This council was intended to serve as a substitute parliament, although it only had the right to make recommendations. Legislative functions were granted to a new and larger body, the State Council, created in early March 1992. By May 1992, the State Council had sixty-eight members, including representa-

tives of more than thirty political parties and twenty social movements that had opposed Gamsakhurdia. Efforts were also made to bring in representatives of Georgia's ethnic minorities, although no Abkhazian or Ossetian representatives participated in the new council.

Almost immediately after Gamsakhurdia's ouster, Sigua resumed his position as prime minister and created a working group to draft a new election law that would legitimize the next elected government. Immediately after the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia, the new government feared that Gamsakhurdia retained enough support in Georgia to regain power in the next election. As a result, in March the State Council adopted an electoral system based on the single transferable vote. The system would virtually guarantee representation by small parties and make it difficult for a party list headed by one prominent figure to translate a majority of popular votes into parliamentary control.

New Parties and Shevardnadze's Return

After his return to Georgia in March 1992, Shevardnadze constantly stressed the temporary nature of the new power structure and called for elections as soon as possible. But the leadership postponed balloting until October 1992 because it lacked effective political control over many regions of the country and because of factional wrangling over the new election law. Registration of political parties, which had been suspended by Gamsakhurdia in 1991, resumed early in 1992. Among new party registrants was the Democratic Union, a group consisting mostly of former members and officials of the communist party. Claiming a broad mass following, this party had organizations in most regions of the county. Although wooed by the Democratic Union and other parties, Shevardnadze avoided party affiliation in order to maintain his independent position. The parliament that would be elected in October 1992 clearly would be an interim body given the task of writing a new constitution. Accordingly, the term of office was set for three years.

The Election of 1992

After a series of last-minute changes, the electoral system for October 1992 was a compromise combination of single-member districts and proportional voting by party lists. To give regional parties a chance to gain representation, separate party

Burned-out headquarters building of Georgian Communist Party, Tbilisi, 1992
Courtesy Michael W. Serafin

lists were submitted for each of ten historical regions of Georgia. In a change from the 1990 system, no minimum percentage was set for a party to achieve representation in parliament if the party did sufficiently well regionally to seat candidates. Forty-seven parties and four coalitions registered to participate in the 1992 election. For the first time, the Central Election Commission accepted the registration of every party that submitted an application.

The largest of the electoral alliances, and one of the most controversial, was the Peace Bloc (Mshvidoba). This broad coalition of seven parties ranged from the heavily ex-communist Democratic Union to the Union for the Revival of Ajaria, a party of the conservative Ajarian political elite. Ultimately, the strong programmatic differences among the seven parties would render the Peace Bloc ineffective as a parliamentary fac-

tion. The Democratic Union filled as much as 70 percent of the places given the coalition on the party lists. In the 1992 election, the Peace Bloc drew a plurality of votes, thus earning the coalition twenty-nine seats in parliament.

The second most important coalition, the October 11 Bloc, included moderate reform leaders of four parties. Members typically had academic backgrounds with few or no communist connections, and the median age of bloc leaders was about fifteen years less than that of the Democratic Union leadership. The October 11 Bloc won eighteen seats, the second largest number in the 1992 election.

A third coalition, the Unity Bloc (Ertoba), lost two of its four member parties before the election. Many of the leaders of the Liberal-Democratic National Party, one of the two remaining constituent parties of the Unity Bloc, were, like the leaders of the Democratic Union, former communist officials who continued to hold influential posts in the Georgian government and the mass media. Both the Peace Bloc and the Unity Bloc put prominent cultural figures at the top of their electoral lists to gain attention.

Shevardnadze's actions were crucial in building the foundation for the 1992 election. From the time of his return to Georgia, Shevardnadze enjoyed unparalleled respect and recognition. Because of his unique position, the State Council acted to separate Shevardnadze from party politics by creating a potentially powerful new elected post, chairman of parliament, which would also be contested in the October elections. Because no other candidate emerged, Shevardnadze was convinced to forgo partisan politics and grasp this opportunity for national leadership.

The elections took place as scheduled in October 1992 in most regions of the country. International monitors from ten nations reported that, with minor exceptions, the balloting was free and fair. Predictably, Gamsakhurdia declared the results rigged and invalid. Interethnic tensions and Gamsakhurdia's activity forced postponement of elections in nine of the eighty-four administrative districts, located in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and western Georgia. Voters in those areas were encouraged to travel to adjoining districts, however, to vote in all but the regional races. Together, the nonvoting districts represented 9.1 percent of the registered voters in Georgia. In no voting district did less than 60 percent of eligible voters participate.

An important factor in the high voter turnout was the special ballot for Shevardnadze as chairman of the new parliament; a large number of voters cast ballots only for Shevardnadze and submitted blank or otherwise invalid ballots for the other races. Shevardnadze received an overwhelming endorsement, winning approximately 96 percent of the vote. In all, fifty-one of the ninety-two members of the previous State Council were elected to the new parliament. The four sitting members of the State Council Presidium (Shevardnadze, Ioseliani, Sigua, and Kitovani) also were reelected.

Formation of the Shevardnadze Government

An immediate goal after Shevardnadze's return was to avoid repeating the one-man rule imposed by Gamsakhurdia while keeping a sufficiently tight grip on central power to prevent regional separatism. The newly elected parliament convened for the first time in November 1992. The lack of dominant parties and the large number of independent deputies ensured that Shevardnadze would dominate parliamentary sessions. The precise role of Shevardnadze was not clear at the time of the elections; on November 6, the parliament ratified proposals on this subject in the Law on State Power. Instead of reestablishing the post of president that had been created by—and was still claimed by—Gamsakhurdia, parliament gave Shevardnadze a new title, head of state. In theory, parliament was to elect the holder of this office, although in practice the position was understood to be combined with the popularly elected post of chairman of the parliament. Thus an impasse between the executive and the legislative branches was avoided by giving the same person a top role in both, but the division of power between the branches remained unclear in early 1994.

The Cabinet

The government team selected by Shevardnadze, called the Cabinet of Ministers, was quickly approved by parliament in November 1992. Tengiz Sigua returned as prime minister. Four deputy prime ministers were chosen in November 1992, including Tengiz Kitovani, former head of the National Guard and minister of defense in the new cabinet. In December 1992, the Presidium of the Cabinet of Ministers was created. This body included the prime minister and his deputy prime ministers, as well as the ministers of agriculture, economics, finance, foreign affairs, and state property management.

In December 1992, the Georgian government included eighteen ministries, four state committees, and fifteen departments, which together employed more than 7,600 officials. Many appointees to top government posts, including several ministers, had held positions in the apparatus of the Georgian Communist Party. Although Shevardnadze's early appointments favored his contemporaries and former associates, by late 1993 about half of the positions in the top state administrative apparatus were held by academics. Less than 10 percent were former communists, about 75 percent were under age forty, and more than half came from opposition parties.

In September 1993, the cabinet included the following ministries: agriculture and the food industry; communications; culture; defense; economic reform; education; environment; finance; foreign affairs; health; industry; internal affairs; justice; labor and social security; state property management; and trade and supply. Each of the five deputy prime ministers supervised a group of ministries.

In practice, the Cabinet of Ministers was a major obstacle to reform in 1993. Pro-reform ministers were isolated by the domination of former communists in the Presidium, which stood between Shevardnadze and the administrative machinery of the ministries. In 1993 Shevardnadze himself was reluctant to push hard for the rapid reforms advocated by progressives in parliament. The cabinet was superficially restructured in August 1993, but reformers clamored for a smaller cabinet under direct control of the head of state.

Parliament

In 1993 some twenty-six parties and eleven factions held seats in the new parliament, which continued to be called the Supreme Soviet. The legislative branch's basic powers were outlined in the Law on State Power, an interim law rescinding the strict limits placed on legislative activity by Gamsakhurdia's 1991 constitution. Thus in 1993 the parliament had the power to elect and dismiss the head of state by a two-thirds vote; to nullify laws passed by local or national bodies if they conflicted with national law; to decide questions of war and peace; to reject any candidate for national office proposed by the head of state; and, upon demand of one-fifth of the deputies, to declare a vote of no confidence in the sitting cabinet.

Activity within the legislative body was prescribed by the Temporary Regulation of the Georgian Parliament. The parlia-

ment as a whole elected all administrative officials, including a speaker and two deputy speakers. Seventeen specialized commissions examined all bills in their respective fields. The speaker had little power over commission chairs or over deputies in general, and parliament suffered from an inefficient structure, insufficient staff, and poor communications. The two days per week allotted for legislative debate often did not allow full consideration of bills.

The major parliamentary reform factions—the Democrats, the Greens, the Liberals, the National Democrats, and the Republicans—were not able to maintain a coalition to promote reform legislation. Of that group, the National Democrats showed the most internal discipline. Shevardnadze received support from a large group of deputies from single-member districts, aligned with Liberals and Democrats. His radical opposition, a combination of several very small parties, was weakened by disunity, but it frequently was able to obstruct debate. The often disorderly parliamentary debates reduced support among the Georgian public, to whom sessions were widely televised.

In November 1993, Shevardnadze was able to merge three small parties with a breakaway faction of the Republicans to form a new party, the Union of Citizens of Georgia, of which he became chairman. This was a new step for the head of state, who previously had refrained from political identification and had relied on temporary coalitions to support his policies. At the same time, Shevardnadze also sought to include the entire loose parliamentary coalition that had recently supported him, in a concerted effort to normalize government after the Abkhazian crisis abated.

The Chief Executive

The 1992 Law on State Power gave Shevardnadze power beyond the executive functions of presidential office. As chairman of parliament, he had the right to call routine or extraordinary parliamentary sessions, preside over parliamentary deliberations, and propose constitutional changes and legislation. As head of state, Shevardnadze nominated the prime minister, the cabinet, the chairman of the Information and Intelligence Service, and the president of the National Bank of Georgia (although the parliament had the right of approval of these officials).

Without parliamentary approval, the head of state appointed all senior military leaders and provincial officials such as prefects and mayors. Additional power came from his control of the entire system of state administration, and he could form his own administrative apparatus, which had the potential to act as a shadow government beyond the control of any other branch. Key agencies chaired by Shevardnadze in 1993 were the Council for National Security and Defense, the Emergency Economic Council, and the Scientific and Technical Commission, which advised on military and industrial questions.

In response to calls by the opposition for his resignation during the Abkhazian crisis of mid-1993, Shevardnadze requested and received from parliament emergency powers to appoint all ministers except the prime minister and to issue decrees on economic policy without legislative approval. When the Sigua government resigned in August, parliament quickly approved Shevardnadze's nomination of industrialist Otar Patsatsia as prime minister. Although Shevardnadze argued that greater central power was necessary to curb turmoil, his critics saw him setting a precedent for future dictatorship and human rights abuses.

The Judicial System

When Georgia was part of the Soviet Union, the Supreme Court of Georgia was subordinate to the Supreme Court of the Soviet Union, and the rule of law in Georgia, still based largely on the Soviet constitution, included the same limitations on personal rights. Beginning in 1990, the court system of Georgia began a major transition toward establishment of an independent judiciary that would replace the powerless rubber-stamp courts of the Soviet period. The first steps, taken in late 1990, were to forbid Supreme Court judges from holding communist party membership and to remove Supreme Court activities from the supervision of the party. After the overthrow of Gamsakhurdia, the pre-Soviet constitution of 1921 was restored, providing the legal basis for separation of powers and an independent court. Substantial opposition to actual independence was centered in the Cabinet of Ministers, however, some of whose members would lose de facto judicial power.

The Supreme Court

In 1993 the Supreme Court had thirty-nine members, of

whom nine worked on civil cases and thirty on criminal cases. All judges had been elected for ten-year terms in 1990 and 1991. Shevardnadze made no effort to replace judges elected under Gamsakhurdia, although they had been seated under a different constitutional system. The Supreme Court's functions include interpreting laws, trying cases of serious criminal acts and appeals of regional court decisions, and supervising application of the law by other government agencies.

The Procurator General

The postcommunist judicial system has continued the multiple role of the procurator general's office as an agency of investigation, a constitutional court supervising the application of the law, and the institution behind prosecution of crimes in court. In 1993 the procurator general's office retained a semimilitary structure and total authority over the investigation of court cases; judges had no power to reject evidence gained improperly. Advocates of democratization identified abolition of the office of procurator general as essential, with separation of the responsibilities of the procurator general and the courts as a first step.

Prospects for Reform

All parties in Georgia agreed that judicial reform depended on passage of a new constitution delineating the separation of powers. If such a constitution prescribed a strong executive system, the head of state would appoint Supreme Court judges; if a parliamentary system were called for, parliament would make the court appointments. In early 1994, however, the constitution was the subject of prolonged political wrangling that showed no sign of abating. At that point, experts found a second fundamental obstacle to judicial reform in a national psychology that had no experience with democratic institutions and felt most secure with a unitary, identifiable government power. Reform was also required in the training of lawyers and judges, who under the old system entered the profession through the sponsorship of political figures rather than on their own merit.

Regional Courts

Until the Gamsakhurdia period, regional courts were elected by regional party soviets; since 1990 regional courts have been appointed by regional officials. After the beginning

of ethnic struggles in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, regional military courts also were established. The head of state appoints military judges, and the Supreme Court reviews military court decisions. The Tbilisi City Court has separate jurisdiction in supervising the observance of laws in the capital city.

The Constitution

Under Gamsakhurdia, Georgia had continued to function under the Soviet-era constitution of 1978, which was based on the 1977 constitution of the Soviet Union. The first postcommunist parliament amended that document extensively. In February 1992, the Georgian National Congress (the alternate parliament elected in 1990) formally designated the Georgian constitution of February 21, 1921, as the effective constitution of Georgia. That declaration received legitimacy from the signatures of Jaba Ioseliani and Tengiz Kitovani, at that time two of the three members of the governing Military Council.

In February 1993, Shevardnadze called for extensive revisions of the 1921 constitution. Characterizing large sections of that document as wholly unacceptable, Shevardnadze proposed forming a constitutional commission to draft a new version by December 1993. According to Shevardnadze's timetable, the draft would be refined by parliament in the spring of 1994 and then submitted for approval by popular referendum in the fall of 1994.

Human Rights

Human rights protection and media freedom have been hindered in postcommunist Georgia by the national government's assumption of central executive power to deal with states of political and military emergency and by the existence of semi-independent military forces. In 1993 the expression of opposition views in the independent media was interrupted by official and unofficial actions against newspapers and broadcasters, despite a stated policy that expression of antigovernment views would be tolerated if not accompanied by violent acts.

Both sides of the Abkhazian conflict claimed widespread interference with civilian human rights by their opponents. Among the charges were abuse of military prisoners, the taking of civilian hostages, and the shelling and blockading of civilian areas. In 1993 the Shevardnadze government began addressing claims of human rights abuses by its military forces and police, particularly against Gamsakhurdia partisans and the Abkhazian

population. In January the Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights and Ethnic Minority Affairs formed the Council of Ethnic Minorities, which met with representatives of the Meskhetian Turk exile population to resolve the grievances of that group. At the same time, the Interethnic Congress of the People of Georgia was formed to improve ethnic Georgians' appreciation of minority rights.

Despite the government's efforts, the Abkhazian conflict continued the tension between necessary wartime controls and the need to protect human rights. In June 1993, the international human rights group Helsinki Watch cited Georgia for political persecution, media obstruction, and military abuses of civilian rights, and in October the United States listed human rights progress as a prerequisite for continued economic aid.

The Media

The 1992 Law on the Press nominally reversed the rigorous state censorship of the Soviet and Gamsakhurdia periods and guaranteed freedom of speech. In 1993 Georgian law contained no prohibition of public criticism of the head of state, and Shevardnadze was subjected to accusations and comments from every direction. Three television channels are in operation; one, Ibervision, is run independently. Numerous independent newspapers are published; *Sakartvelos Respublika* (The Georgian Republic) presents the official government view in the daily press.

Despite some liberalization, in 1994 national security remained a rationale for media restriction. During the crisis of September 1993, two pro-Gamsakhurdia newspapers were closed, and the office of an independent weekly was attacked by gunmen. The Free Media Association, an organization composed of eight independent newspapers, blamed a progovernment party for the attack. After his controversial decision in October to join the CIS, Shevardnadze threatened to close hostile newspapers, and no television channel discussed the widespread disagreement with the head of state's CIS initiative.

Foreign Relations

Georgia's long tradition as a crossroads of East-West commerce was interrupted by the trade practices of the Soviet Union and then by Gamsakhurdia's isolationist policy. Although the Shevardnadze government sought to revive the national economy by reinstating ties with both East and West,

in 1992 and 1993 domestic turmoil prevented major steps in that direction. In 1993 Shevardnadze traveled widely among the former Soviet republics (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Turkmenistan) and elsewhere (Germany, China, and the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in Belgium) to solidify Georgia's international position and to solicit aid. By September, Georgia had diplomatic relations with seventy-eight countries and economic cooperation treaties with sixteen.

The Soviet and Gamsakhurdia Periods

Soviet policy effectively cut traditional commercial and diplomatic links to Turkey, which became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—see Glossary) in 1952, and to Iran, a United States ally until the late 1970s. Instead, virtually all transportation and commercial links were directed to Russia and the other Soviet republics. The same redirection occurred with diplomatic ties, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union controlled. Shevardnadze's presence as Soviet foreign minister from 1985 to 1990 provided little direct benefit to Georgia aside from the large number of high-ranking guests who visited the republic in that period. That group included Britain's Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and United States Secretary of State George Shultz.

Under Gamsakhurdia, Georgia's efforts to break out of the diplomatic isolation of the Soviet period were stymied by the reluctance of the outside world to recognize breakaway republics while the Soviet Union still existed. Romania, which granted recognition in August 1991, was one of the few countries to do so during the Gamsakhurdia period. Several Georgian delegations came to the United States in 1991 in an effort to establish diplomatic ties, but Washington largely ignored those efforts. Given stable internal conditions, the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late 1991 would have released Georgia from its isolation, but by that time the revolt against Gamsakhurdia was in full force. After the violent overthrow of Gamsakhurdia, other governments were reluctant to recognize the legitimacy of his successors. This situation changed in March 1992, when the internationally prominent Shevardnadze returned to Georgia and became chairman of the State Council.

In 1992 and 1993, United States aid to Georgia totaled US$224 million, most of it humanitarian, placing Georgia sec-

ond in United States aid per capita among the former Soviet republics. In September 1993, Shevardnadze appealed directly to the United States Congress for additional aid. At that time, President William J.Clinton officially backed Shevardnadze's efforts to maintain the territorial integrity of Georgia. Reports of human rights offenses against opposition figures, however, brought United States warnings late in 1993 that continued support depended on the Georgian government's observance of international human rights principles.

The Foreign Policy Establishment

In his role as head of the State Council, Shevardnadze exerted a strong and direct influence on Georgia's foreign policy prior to the 1992 election. The additional post of head of state, which he acquired after the election, gave him the right to conduct negotiations with foreign governments and to sign international treaties and agreements. In the Sigua cabinet, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was headed by Alexander Chikhvaidze, who had worked previously in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and was serving as Soviet ambassador to the Netherlands at the time of his appointment in Tbilisi. The Council for National Security and Defense was created in late 1992 to formulate strategic and security policy under the chairmanship of the head of state (see National Security, this ch.).

Revived Contacts in 1992

Shevardnadze's diplomatic contacts and personal relationships with many of the world's leaders ended Georgia's international isolation in 1992. In March, Germany became the first Western country to post an ambassador to Georgia; Shevardnadze's close relations with German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher were a key factor in that decision. Recognition by the United States came in April 1992, and a United States embassy was opened in June 1992. Georgia became the 179th member of the United Nations in July 1992; it was the last of the former Soviet republics to be admitted. By December 1992, six countries had diplomatic missions in Tbilisi: China, Germany, Israel, Russia, Turkey, and the United States. Seventeen other countries began conducting diplomatic affairs with Georgia through their ambassadors to Russia or Ukraine. In August 1993, the United States granted Georgia most-

favored-nation status, and the European Community offered technical economic assistance.

Unlike some former Soviet republics such as Armenia, Lithuania, and Ukraine, Georgia lacked a large number of emigrants in the West who could establish links to the outside world once internal conditions made such connections possible. Small groups of Georgian exiles lived in Paris and other European capitals, but they were mostly descended from members of the Social Democratic government that had been forced into exile with the incorporation of Georgia into the Soviet empire in 1921.

The only large group of emigrants that maintained contact with Georgia were Georgian Jews who had taken advantage of the Soviet Union's expansion of Jewish emigration rights in the 1970s and 1980s. Because Jews had lived in Georgia for many centuries and because Georgia had no history of anti-Semitism, many Georgian Jews continued to feel an attachment to Georgia and its culture, language, and people. Largely as a result of these ties, relations between Georgia and Israel flourished on many levels.

Relations with Neighboring Countries

Of particular importance to Georgia's postcommunist foreign policy and national security was the improvement of relations with neighbors on all sides: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Russia, and Turkey. This goal was complicated by a number of ethnic and political issues as well as by historical differences.

Armenia and Azerbaijan

Among the former Soviet republics, the neighboring Transcaucasian nations of Armenia and Azerbaijan have special significance for Georgia. Despite Georgia's obvious cultural and religious affinities with Armenia, relations between Georgia and Muslim Azerbaijan generally have been closer than those with Christian Armenia. Economic and political factors have contributed to this situation. First, Georgian fuel needs make good relations with Azerbaijan vital to the health of the Georgian economy. Second, Georgians have sympathized with Azerbaijan's position in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the ethnic Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh because of similarities to Georgia's internal problems with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both countries have cited the principle of "inviolability of state borders" in defending

Eduard Shevardnadze on official visit to the United States with President William J. Clinton, March 1994
Courtesy White House Photo Office

national interests against claims by ethnic minorities (see fig. 3; Nagorno-Karabakh and Independence, ch. 1; After Communist Rule, ch. 2).

In December 1990, Georgia under Gamsakhurdia signed a cooperation agreement with Azerbaijan affecting the economic, scientific, technical, and cultural spheres. In February 1993, Georgia under Shevardnadze concluded a far-reaching treaty of friendship, cooperation, and mutual relations with Azerbaijan, including a mutual security arrangement and assurances that Georgia would not reexport Azerbaijani oil or natural gas to Armenia. In 1993 Azerbaijan exerted some pressure on Georgia to join the blockade of Armenia and to curb incursions by Armenians from Georgian territory into Azerbaijan. The issue of discrimination against the Azerbaijani minority in Georgia, a serious matter during Gamsakhurdia's tenure, was partially resolved under Shevardnadze.

In the early 1990s, Armenia maintained fundamentally good relations with Georgia. The main incentive for this policy was the fact that Azerbaijan's blockade of Armenian transport routes and pipelines meant that routes through Georgia were Armenia's only direct connection with the outside world. Other considerations in the Armenian view were the need to protect the Armenians in Georgia and the need to stem the overflow of violence from Georgian territory. The official ties

that Georgia forged with Azerbaijan between 1991 and 1993 strained relations with Armenia, which was in an undeclared state of war with Azerbaijan throughout that period. Nevertheless, Gamsakhurdia signed a treaty with Armenia on principles of cooperation in July 1991, and Shevardnadze signed a friendship treaty with Armenia in May 1993. With the aim of restoring mutually beneficial economic relations in the Transcaucasus, Shevardnadze also attempted (without success) to mediate the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict in early 1993.

Russia

Of all countries, Georgia's relations with Russia were both the most important and the most ambivalent. Russia (and previously the Soviet Union) was deeply involved at many levels in theconflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and in 1993 Ajarian leaders also declared Russia the protector of their national interests. Thus Russia seemingly holds the key to a resolution of those conflicts in a way that would avoid the fragmentation of Georgia. Trade ties with Russia, disrupted by Gamsakhurdia's struggle with Gorbachev and by ethnic conflicts on Georgia's borders with Russia, also are critical to reviving the Georgian economy.

Russia recognized Georgia's independence in mid-1992 and appointed an ambassador in October. In 1993 Russia's official position was that a stable, independent Georgia was necessary for security along Russia's southern border. The conditions behind that position were Russia's need for access to the Black Sea, which was endangered by shaky relations with Ukraine, the need for a buffer between Russia and Islamic extremist movements Russia feared in Turkey and Iran, the need to protect the 370,000 ethnic Russians in Georgia, and the refugee influx and violence in the Russian Caucasus caused by turmoil across the mountains in Georgia. Although Shevardnadze was officially well regarded, Russian nationalists, many of them in the Russian army, wished to depose him as punishment for his initial refusal to bring Georgia into the CIS and for his role as the Soviet foreign minister who "lost" the former Soviet republics in 1991.

In pursuing its official goals, Russia offered mediation of Georgia's conflicts with the Abkhazian, Ajarian, and Ossetian minorities, encouraging Georgia to increase the autonomy of those groups for the sake of national stability. At the same time, Russian military policy makers openly declared Georgia's stra-

tegic importance to Russian national security. Such statements raised suspicions that, as in 1801 and 1921, Russia would take advantage of Georgia's weakened position and sweep the little republic back into the empire.

Despite the misgivings of his fellow Georgians, in 1993 Shevardnadze pursued talks toward a comprehensive bilateral Georgian-Russian treaty of friendship. Discussions were interrupted by surges of fighting in Abkhazia, however, and relations were cooled by Shevardnadze's claim that Russia was aiding the secessionist campaign that had begun in August.

In September 1993, the fall of Sukhumi to Abkhazian forces signaled the crumbling of the Georgian army, and the return of Gamsakhurdia threatened to split Georgia into several parts. Shevardnadze, recognizing the necessity of outside military help to maintain his government, agreed to join the CIS on terms dictated by Russia in return for protection of government supply lines by Russian troops. Meanwhile, despite denials by the Yeltsin government, an unknown number of Russians still gave "unofficial" military advice and matériel to the Abkhazian forces, which experts believed would not have posed a major threat to Tbilisi without such assistance. Shevardnadze defended CIS membership at home as an absolute necessity for Georgia's survival as well as a stimulant to increased trade with Russia.

Turkey

Despite a history of episodic Turkish invasions, Shevardnadze courted Turkey as an economic and diplomatic partner. Georgians took advantage of the opening of border traffic with Turkey to begin vigorous commercial activities with their nearest "capitalist" neighbor. In 1992 Georgia became a member of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization, which is based in Turkey. In December 1992, Turkey granted Georgia a credit equivalent to US$50 million to purchase wheat and other goods and to stimulate Turkish private investment in the republic. Georgia also signed several diplomatic agreements with Turkey in the early 1990s, including a Georgian pledge to respect existing common borders and official Turkish support of Georgian national integrity against the Abkhazian separatist movement. The issue of reinstatement of exiled Meskhetian Turks eased in 1993 when Georgia established official contacts with that minority (see Human Rights, this ch.).

National Security

Military forces have played a critical role in Georgian politics since 1989. In January 1992, Georgia's president was overthrown by military force, and the Shevardnadze regime relied heavily on the armed forces to stay in power. Warfare in the autonomous regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, as well as armed resistance by Gamsakhurdia supporters in western Georgia, have further emphasized the military's major role in national security.

The Military Establishment

Almost from its inception in late 1990, the National Guard became directly involved in Georgian politics. By 1992 repeated human rights offenses against Gamsakhurdia supporters brought calls to change this role. At the same time, the political rivalry between Ioseliani and Kitovani, the leaders of the Mkhedrioni (horsemen) and the National Guard, respectively, became one of the key conflicts in the Georgian government hierarchy, and many political parties continued to retain private armies in the guise of armed bodyguards or security teams. Discipline problems in the ranks of both the National Guard and the Mkhedrioni and their ineffectiveness as fighting forces led the Georgian government to plan for a professional army. In April 1992, the State Council adopted a resolution to form a unified armed force of up to 20,000 soldiers.

At the time the government announced its plans for a professional army, however, neither existing military group had sufficient internal discipline to carry out major restructuring. Efforts to disband the National Guard and Mkhedrioni were delayed by continued violence in western Georgia, by an attempted coup in Tbilisi by Gamsakhurdia supporters, and by the political ambitions of Kitovani and Ioseliani. In May 1992, Kitovani was designated minister of defense in an effort to bring the National Guard under central control. Instead, during the following year Kitovani turned his position into a power center rivaling Shevardnadze's. In May 1993, Shevardnadze induced Kitovani and Ioseliani to resign from their powerful positions on the Council for National Security and Defense, depriving both men of influence over national security policy and enhancing the stature of the head of state.

Shevardnadze complained in early 1993 that a unified army had still not been created. In May the National Guard was abol-

ished as a separate force, and individual distinguished units remained in existence with special guard status. In the second half of 1993, however, outside threats to national security caused Shevardnadze to rely once again on Ioseliani's paramilitary Mkhedrioni, delaying consolidation of a national military force. In September, Shevardnadze's control over the military improved when parliament declared a two-month state of emergency, which had the effect of weakening the Mkhedrioni.

The Russian Presence

The Soviet Union had maintained a substantial military presence in Georgia because the republic bordered Turkey, a member of NATO. The Transcaucasus Military District, which had coordinated Soviet military forces in the three republics of Transcaucasia, was headquartered in Tbilisi. In mid-1993 an estimated 15,000 Russian troops and border guards remained on Georgian territory. Georgia did not press Russian withdrawal as vigorously as did other former republics of the Soviet Union because it did not have enough personnel to patrol its entire border. At the same time, the continued presence of Russian troops energized the Georgian nationalist parties. In the fall of 1993, those groups saw Shevardnadze's call for Russian military assistance, and the significant increase of Russian forces that resulted, as an admission that his national security policy had failed and a sign that the traditional enemy to the north was again threatening.

Draft Policy

The role of Soviet military and internal security forces in the April Tragedy made Georgian connections with those forces a primary target of anticommunist groups. As in other Soviet republics, opposition to the draft became an early focus of opposition activities. Of all the Soviet republics, Georgia had the lowest rate of recruitment in the fall of 1990, approximately 10 percent of eligible citizens. One of the first acts passed by Gamsakhurdia's parliament ended the Soviet military draft on Georgian territory.

In late 1990, Soviet conscription was replaced with the induction of eligible Georgian males into new "special divisions," under the control of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, for the maintenance of order within the republic. The new body, which became Kitovani's National Guard, was one of the first official non-Soviet military units in what was still the

Soviet Union. Attempts to build a new Georgian national army in 1993 and 1994 were hindered by a very high percentage of draft evasion.

Arms Supply

Relatively little of the military industry of the Soviet Union was located in Georgia. One Tbilisi plant assembled military training aircraft that were the basis of a small Georgian air force. Most weapons obtained by the various armed units operating in Georgia after 1990 apparently were purchased illegally from Soviet (and later Russian) officers and soldiers stationed in the Caucasus. In May 1992, leaders of the CIS set quotas for the transfer of Soviet military equipment to republic armed forces. According to this plan, Georgia was to receive 220 tanks, 220 armored vehicles, 300 artillery pieces, 100 military aircraft, and fifty attack helicopters. Kitovani complained in December 1992 that Georgia had not yet received any of its allotment.

Internal Security

The Georgian internal security agency having the closest ties to Moscow was the Georgian branch of the Committee for State Security (Komitet gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti—KGB). Beginning in 1990, the anticommunist independence movement exerted direct pressure on the Georgian KGB to accept independence. The first confrontation between Moscow and the Gamsakhurdia government came over appointments to top security posts in the republic. In November 1990, the Georgian parliamentary Commission on Security broke the tradition of Moscow-designated KGB chiefs by naming its own appointee. When Gorbachev threatened dire consequences, Gamsakhurdia simply left the chairmanship vacant but named his candidate first deputy chairman and thus acting chairman. At that point, top Georgian KGB officials voiced support for Gamsakhurdia and protested Gorbachev's interference, signaling a service commitment to Tbilisi rather than to Moscow.

As late as mid-1991, Moscow continued financing activities of the Georgian KGB and provided part of the budget of the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs, which ran domestic intelligence and police agencies. Meanwhile, by 1991 the opposition to Gamsakhurdia was accusing the president of using the Georgian KGB to investigate and harass political enemies.

In May 1992, the Georgian KGB, which in the interim had been renamed the Ministry of Security, was formally replaced

by the Information and Intelligence Service. The new agency, established on the organizational foundation of the old KGB, was headed by Irakli Batiashvili, a thirty-year-old philosophy scholar who had been a National Democratic Party delegate to the National Congress.

Civilian National Security Organization

In November 1992, the parliament passed a law creating the Council for National Security and Defense. This body was accountable to parliament, but, as head of state and commander in chief of the armed forces, Shevardnadze was council chairman. Shevardnadze named Ioseliani and Kitovani deputy chairmen of the council; Tedo Japaridze, top expert on the United States in the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, became the chairman's aide. The powers of the council included the right to issue binding decisions on military and security matters.

In May 1993, Shevardnadze disbanded the council to deprive Ioseliani and Kitovani of their government power bases. The council was then reconstituted, with Shevardnadze's chairmanship assuming greater power.

Crime

In the first postcommunist years, levels of crime and civil unrest in Georgia were quite high because of the proximity of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, refugee movement and terrorism resulting from the Abkhazian conflict within Georgia, the gap between official wages and living standards, and the government's lack of police authority in many areas of the country. Crime statistics were unreliable, however, because the extent of law enforcement and reporting varied during 1993. Reported crimes dropped from 1,982 in May to 1,260 in July. In late 1993, however, numerous automobile thefts and kidnappings occurred on Georgian highways, and citizen insecurity prompted the proliferation of private detective agencies.

The natural gas pipeline to Armenia was a frequent target of terrorist bombs in 1993, and several government figures apparently were the targets of unsuccessful bomb attacks. The Mkhedrioni, who often were involved in criminal activity, usually escaped police control because the minister of internal affairs was a Mkhedrioni member. In September, Shevardnadze took personal control of the ministry to bolster police authority.

Long-Term Security

In late 1993, the primary consideration of Georgian national security continued to be the prevention of territorial gains by separatist national movements—a cause for which Russian military assistance was proving indispensable. Longer-term national security, however, would depend on Shevardnadze's ability to reestablish the structures of a viable, unified state: internal and international commercial activity, undisputed sovereignty over the national territory and its populace, and a shift back to government rule by statute rather than by emergency executive powers. In early 1994, all those preconditions remained in doubt, and Shevardnadze's reluctant recourse to Russian military assistance had set a precedent with unknown national security consequences.

* * *

For background on Georgian history, the best basic source is Ronald G. Suny's *The Making of the Georgian Nation.* Earlier histories on the Georgian people were written by David Marshall Lang (*A Modern History of Soviet Georgia* and *The Georgians*) and Kalistrat Salia (*History of the Georgian Nation*). Several scholars have followed contemporary Georgian developments on a regular basis; in addition to the present author, they include Elizabeth Fuller, a writer for the *RFE/RL Research Report*; Stephen Jones, whose journal articles cover political and nationalist issues in the Caucasus; and Robert Parsons of the British Broadcasting Corporation. Human rights issues in Georgia are covered extensively in publications of the United States Congress's Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Useful articles from Russian-language sources are translated in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service's *Daily Report: Soviet Union* (more recently titled *Daily Report: Central Eurasia*). Studies of Georgian culture and history appear occasionally in the *Journal for the Study of Caucasia.* And the *Georgian Chronicle* is a monthly bulletin on current events published by the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development in Tbilisi. (For further information and complete citations, see Bibliography.)

Appendix

Table

Table 1. Metric Conversion Coefficients and Factors

When you kow	Multiply by	To find
Millimeters	0.04	inches
Centimeters	0.39	inches
Meters	3.3	feet
Kilometers	0.62	miles
Hectares (10,000 m^2)	2.47	acres
Square kilometers	0.39	square miles
Cubic meters	35.3	cubic feet
Liters	0.26	gallons
Kilograms	2.2	pounds
Metric tons	0.98	long tons
	1.1	short tons
	2,204.0	pounds
Degrees Celsius (Centigrade)	1.8 and add 32	degrees Fahrenheit

Table 2. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Selected Health and Health Care Statistics, 1989, 1990, and 1991

	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
Disease diagnosis[1]			
Tuberculosis	17.6	36.2	28.9
Viral hepatitis	279.0	310.5	226.3
Cancer	223.1	224.9	140.9
Hospital beds[2]	89.4	99.4	110.7
Doctors[2]	42.8	38.9	59.2
Pharmacists[3]	7.0	6.7	14.3
Infant mortality[4]	17.1	25.0	15.9

[1] For tuberculosis and cancer, first diagnoses per 100,000 population in 1990; for viral hepatitis, registered cases per 100,000 population in 1989.
[2] Per 10,000 population: in 1990 for Georgia, in 1991 for Armenia and Azerbaijan.
[3] Per 10,000 population in 1989.
[4] Per 1,000 live births: in 1990 for Georgia, in 1991 for Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Source: Based on information from Christopher M. Davis, "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 40, October 8, 1993, 36.

Table 3. Armenia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1989, 1990, and 1991

Product	1989	1990	1991
Automobile tires (in thousands)	1,338	1,009	914
Cable (in kilometers)	13,772	8,459	7,746
Canned food (in thousands of cans)	413,119	267,425	181,860
Carpets (in thousands of square meters)	1,585	1,300	947
Cement (in thousands of tons)	1,639	1,466	1,507
Electric energy (in millions of kilowatt-hours)	12,137	10,377	9,532
Electric engines	736,490	823,295	700,157
Leather shoes (in thousands of pairs)	17,952	18,740	11,340
Natural textile items	90,723	85,473	53,203
Synthetic fibers (in tons)	10,479	9,351	4,050
Synthetic rubber (in tons)	39,150	1,141	10,613
Wine and cognac (in thousands of decaliters)	7,104	4,805	4,852

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Armenia*, Washington, 1993, 40.

Table 4. Armenia: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 1991 (items per 100 families)

Product	1989	1990	1991
Automobiles	33	34	39
Refrigerators	81	81	80
Sewing machines	54	52	50
Tape recorders	42	46	49
Televisions	93	95	93
Washing machines	89	95	96

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993*, Washington, 1993, 73.

Table 5. Armenia: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989–92
(in thousands of people)

Activity	1989	1990	1991	1992[1]
Agriculture	117	115	46	20
Industry	417	398	359	344
Construction	156	167	162	122
Communications	13	13	12	20
Transportation	65	64	69	51
Health and social services	91	90	93	81
Education	143	154	130	152
Science and research and development	52	52	35	30
Other	248	231	231	192
TOTAL	1,302	1,284	1,137	1,012

[1] January to June.

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Armenia*, Washington, 1993, 44.

Table 6. Armenia: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected Years, 1970–90
(in kilograms unless otherwise specified)

Food	1970	1980	1985	1990
Bread	154	140	131	126
Eggs (in units)	94	146	148	163
Fish	4	4	5	8
Meat	34	47	49	56
Milk and dairy products	328	432	433	446
Potatoes	55	55	65	58
Sugar	26	31	29	39
Vegetable oil	2	3	2	3
Vegetables	101	118	135	132

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 183–84.

Table 7. Armenia: Government Budget, 1991 and 1992[1] (in percentages of GNP)[2]

	1991	1992			
		First Quarter	Second Quarter	Third Quarter	Fourth Quarter[3]
Revenues					
Tax revenues[4]	15.8	10.7	19.6	18.5	15.6
Nontax revenues	10.2	6.0	5.6	5.1	5.3
Total revenues	26.0	16.7	25.2	23.5	20.9
Expenditures					
Current expenditures					
Wages	n.a.[5]	5.6	7.3	6.4	8.9
External interest	n.a.	14.7	9.7	9.3	10.7
Pension and child allowances	n.a.	15.1	13.1	8.9	11.7
Other	n.a.	25.5	7.6	20.0	20.7
Total current expenditures	n.a.	60.9	37.6	44.5	52.1
Capital expenditures	n.a.	4.8	8.7	4.6	5.6
Total expenditures	27.9	65.7	46.4	49.1	57.6
Accrued deficit	-1.9	-49.0	-21.2	-25.6	-36.7
Net change in arrears	n.a.	34.1	10.2	11.8	16.5
Cash deficit	-1.9	-14.9	-11.0	-13.7	-20.2

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
[2] GNP—gross national product.
[3] Projected.
[4] Includes value-added tax; excise, enterprise, and personal income taxes; collection of back taxes; and other taxes.
[5] n.a.—not available.

Source: Based on information from International Monetary Fund, *Armenia*, Washington, 1993, 51.

Table 8. Armenia: Major Trading Partners, 1990

Country	Value[1]		Percentage of Total	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Europe	69	585	66.9	66.8
Bulgaria	12	67	11.7	7.6
Britain	3	10	2.9	1.1
Hungary	6	49	5.8	5.6
Italy	4	20	3.9	2.3
Poland	7	84	6.8	9.6
Romania	4	20	3.9	2.3
Germany	11	139	10.7	15.8
Finland	3	22	2.9	2.5
France	3	27	2.9	3.1
Czechoslovakia	9	80	8.7	9.1
Yugoslavia	2	28	1.9	3.2
Asia	11	148	10.3	16.9
India	2	25	1.9	2.9
China	2	24	1.9	2.7
Japan	1	33	1.0	3.8
North America	8	98	7.7	11.2
Cuba	6	51	5.8	5.8
United States	1	32	1.0	3.6

[1] In millions of rubles.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 40.

Table 9. Azerbaijan: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected Years, 1970–90
(in kilograms unless otherwise specified)

Food	1970	1980	1985	1990
Bread	155	160	158	151
Eggs (in units)	90	134	155	143
Fish	3	3	5	5
Meat	26	32	35	34
Milk and dairy products	227	281	293	292
Potatoes	25	25	28	27
Sugar	33	40	37	36
Vegetable oil	2	2	3	3
Vegetables	47	72	62	67

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 183–84.

Table 10. Azerbaijan: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 1991
(items per 100 families)

Product	1989	1990	1991
Automobiles	16	17	16
Refrigerators	83	83	82
Sewing machines	62	60	58
Tape recorders	36	39	40
Televisions	101	102	101
Washing machines	48	51	52

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993*, Washington, 1993, 75.

Table 11. Azerbaijan: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989, 1990, and 1991
(in thousands of people)

Activity	1989	1990	1991
Agriculture	905	914	934
Forestry	6	5	5
Industry	483	469	463
Construction	243	251	248
Transportation and communications	133	143	143
Trade and commercial services	232	230	233
Housing and municipal services	108	99	101
Science and research and development	60	58	60
Education and culture	329	338	341
Health and social welfare	168	170	173
Government	61	62	62
Other	67	71	73
TOTAL[1]	2,794	2,808	2,839

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1993*, 1, London, 1993, 442.

Table 12. Azerbaijan: Population and Employment, 1988–91
(in thousands of people)

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total population	6,963	7,064	7,117	7,175
Urban	3,768	3,829	3,843	3,858
Rural	3,195	3,235	3,274	3,317
Total labor force	3,932	3,959	3,977	3,986
Total employed	2,753	2,795	2,808	2,839
In state sector	2,209	2,200	2,173	2,171
In collective farms	304	308	312	325
Self-employed	236	241	260	265
Other	4	46	63	78
Students of working age	325	308	306	307
Employed in households	815	721	729	707

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Azerbaijan: From Crisis to Sustained Growth*, Washington, 1993, 159.

Table 13. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Share of Total Production of Major Agricultural Commodities in Former Soviet Union by Republic, 1986–90 Average
(in percentages)

Commodity	Armenia	Azerbaijan	Georgia
Citrus fruits	0.0	0.0	96.3
Cotton	0.0	7.7	0.0
Eggs	0.7	1.2	1.0
Fruits and berries	2.0	4.3	6.8
Grains	0.2	0.6	0.3
Grapes	3.1	22.6	11.0
Meat	0.5	0.9	0.9
Milk	0.5	1.0	0.7
Potatoes	0.3	0.3	0.5
Sugar beets	0.1	0.0	0.1
Sunflowers	0.0	0.0	0.1
Vegetables	1.8	3.1	2.0
Wool	0.8	2.3	1.4

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 194.

Table 14. Azerbaijan: Output of Selected Industrial Products, 1989, 1990, and 1991
(in thousands of tons unless otherwise specified)

Product	1989	1990	1991
Aviation fuel	114	89	58
Bitumen	167	146	113
Caustic soda	219	160	171
Diesel oil	4,236	3,899	3,635
Electric energy (in millions of kilowatt-hours)	23,300	23,200	23,300
Fuel oil	7,555	6,686	7,207
Jet kerosene	1,519	1,290	1,205
Lubricants	934	818	763
Motor fuel	1,522	1,479	1,174
Naphtha	550	341	427
Petroleum coke	230	179	161
Steel	696	501	462
Sulfuric acid	768	603	552

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1993*, 1, London, 1993, 443.

Table 15. Azerbaijan: Government Budget, 1988–92[1]
(in percentages of GNP)[2]

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992
Revenues					
Tax revenues					
Indirect taxes[3]	10.3	10.7	12.5	13.0	20.4
Direct taxes[4]	8.4	7.9	8.6	8.1	8.0
Total tax revenues	18.7	18.6	21.1	21.1	28.4
Nontax revenues	3.5	3.8	5.3	4.4	3.6
Total revenues	22.3	22.3	26.4	25.5	32.0
Expenditures					
National economy[5]	9.5	10.6	15.1	9.9	2.4
Science	0.0	0.4	0.4	0.2	0.5
Education	6.9	6.7	7.7	7.0	10.3
Health	2.3	2.5	2.9	2.9	4.0
Culture and sports	0.1	0.1	0.1	1.0	1.0
Social security	3.0	3.2	4.0	6.6	2.6
Internal security and defense	0.3	0.3	0.5	1.3	7.6
Consumer subsidies	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	3.7
Other	1.1	0.7	1.3	1.7	5.6
Total expenditures	23.1	24.4	31.9	30.5	37.6
Balance	−0.9	−2.0	−5.5	−5.0	−5.6

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.
[2] GNP—gross national product.
[3] Turnover, sales, excise, and export-import taxes; value-added tax; and duties.
[4] Profit, income, and property taxes.
[5] Investment by budgetary institutions and transfers to the enterprise sector.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Azerbaijan: From Crisis to Sustained Growth*, Washington, 1993, 193.

Table 16. Azerbaijan: Major Trading Partners, 1990

Country	Value[1]		Percentage of Total	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Europe	286	836	62.7	65.3
Bulgaria	41	92	9.0	7.2
Britain	14	12	3.1	0.9
Hungary	27	60	5.9	4.7
Italy	11	54	2.4	4.2
Poland	26	140	5.7	10.9
Romania	16	30	3.5	2.3
Germany	49	172	10.7	13.4
Finland	10	39	2.2	3.0
France	12	22	2.6	1.7
Czechoslovakia	33	109	7.2	8.5
Yugoslavia	11	53	2.4	4.1
Asia	72	262	15.9	20.5
India	9	57	2.0	4.5
China	8	28	1.9	2.7
Japan	11	53	2.4	4.1
North America	31	131	6.9	10.2
Cuba	26	67	5.7	5.2
United States	4	39	0.9	3.0

[1] In millions of rubles.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 68.

Table 17. Georgia: Government Budget, 1991 and 1992 (in millions of rubles)

	1991		1992	
	Budget	Actual	Budget	Actual
Revenues				
Tax revenues	3,972	4,631	22,202	15,218
Nontax revenues	1,295	1,567	2,898	3,655
Total revenues	5,267	6,198	25,100	18,873
Expenditures				
National economy[1]	2,979	2,878	11,885	20,815
Social and cultural				
Education and culture[2]	n.a.[2]	1,520	n.a.	8,421
Health and sports	n.a.	812	n.a.	2,996
Social security	n.a.	120	n.a.	34
Science	n.a.	74	n.a.	874
Total social and cultural	2,717	2,526	10,082	12,325
Administration and law enforcement				
State administration	n.a.	124	n.a.	1,288
Internal security and defense	n.a.	118	n.a.	5,282
Total administration and law enforcement	245	242	2,631	6,570
Other	327	276	1,765	2,972
Total expenditures	6,268	5,922	26,363	42,682
Extrabudgetary factors[3]	n.a.	1,000	12,713	-23,320
Interest on foreign debt	0	0	0	21,714
Balance	-1,001	-724	-13,976	-68,843

[1] Investment by budgetary institutions and transfers to the enterprise sector.
[2] n.a.—not available.
[3] Errors and omissions and extrabudgetary expenditures for social security fund and net lending.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Georgia: A Blueprint for Reforms*, Washington, 1993, 120; and *The Europa World Year Book, 1993*, 1, London, 1993, 50.

Table 18. Georgia: Output of Major Industrial Products, 1990, 1991, and 1992
*(*in thousands of tons unless otherwise specified*)*

Product	1990	1991	1992[1]
Beer (in thousands of decaliters)	9,477	6,011	3,288
Cigarettes (in millions)	11,200	9,800	5,100
Cotton fabric (in millions of square meters)	34	17	13
Diesel fuel	658	495	111
Footwear (in millions of pairs)	13	12	3
Heavy oil (mazut)	898	737	189
Machine tools (in units)	1,565	1,417	1,149
Margarine	34	16	2
Motor fuel	399	324	72
Steel	1,316	962	535
Synthetic fibers	32	20	5
Synthetic resins and plastics	40	26	8
Vegetable oil	14	7	0.1
Wine (in thousands of decaliters)	16,283	12,166	7,130

[1] Estimated.

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1993*, 1, London, 1993, 1236; and United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993*, Washington, 1993, 76.

Table 19. Georgia: Employment by Economic Activity, 1989, 1990, and 1991
(in thousands of people)

Activity	1989	1990	1991
Agriculture	656	695	671
Forestry	12	12	11
Industry	537	560	488
Construction	266	281	225
Transportation and communications	123	115	104
Trade and commercial services	267	257	227
Housing and municipal services	123	131	110
Science and research and development	73	73	63
Education and culture	301	310	290
Health, social welfare, and sports	189	184	186
Banking and financial	12	12	12
Government	55	52	48
Other services	86	82	79
TOTAL[1]	2,700	2,763	2,514

[1] Figures may not add to totals because of rounding.

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1993*, 1, London, 1993, 1235.

Table 20. Georgia: Population and Employment, 1988–91
(in thousands of people)

	1988	1989	1990	1991
Total population	5,396	5,414	5,422	5,421
Males	2,561	2,571	2,579	n.a.[1]
Females	2,835	2,843	2,843	n.a.
Urban	2,989	3,014	3,029	3,024
Rural	2,407	2,400	2,393	2,397
Total employed	2,650	2,635	2,685	2,543
Males employed	n.a.	1,414	n.a.	n.a.
Females employed	n.a.	1,221	n.a.	n.a.
In state sector	2,205	2,148	2,087	1,886
In collective farms	249	218	200	154
Self-employed	177	211	229	356
Other	19	58	169	147

[1] n.a—not available.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Georgia: A Blueprint for Reforms*, Washington, 1993, 109–10.

Table 21. Georgia: Annual Per Capita Food Consumption, Selected Years, 1970–90
(in kilograms unless otherwise specified)

Food	1970	1980	1985	1990
Bread	195	190	190	183
Eggs (in units)	85	135	148	140
Fish	6	8	9	9
Meat	31	43	47	46
Milk and dairy products	235	309	309	289
Potatoes	38	46	49	41
Sugar	35	45	43	39
Vegetable oil	3	5	6	6
Vegetables	51	79	87	82

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 183–84.

Table 22. Georgia: Durable Consumer Goods, 1989, 1990, and 1991 (items per 100 families)

Product	1988	1989	1990
Automobiles	31	31	34
Refrigerators	95	95	95
Sewing machines	63	63	61
Tape recorders	44	48	52
Televisions	102	106	112
Washing machines	76	81	86

Source: Based on information from United States, Central Intelligence Agency, *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993*, Washington, 1993, 77.

Table 23. Georgia: External Trade, 1988, 1989, and 1990
(in millions of rubles)

	1988	1989	1990
Exports			
Oil and gas	100	68	68
Ferrous metallurgy	375	376	318
Chemical fuels	316	343	339
Machines and processed metals	848	869	804
Nonfood light industrial products	1,275	1,285	1,260
Processed foods	2,438	2,573	2,387
Other industrial products	258	275	310
Agricultural products	280	190	404
Other	11	105	93
Total exports	5,901	6,084	5,983
To other Soviet republics	5,508	5,719[1]	5,724
To other countries	393	465[1]	259
Imports			
Oil and gas	413	360	285
Ferrous metallurgy	489	443	430
Nonferrous metallurgy	102	106	97
Chemical fuels	541	544	576
Machines and processed metals	1,533	1,522	1,580
Timber and wood products	248	244	279
Building materials	155	148	117
Nonfood light industrial products	1,221	1,287	1,372
Processed foods	1,204	1,142	1,174
Other industrial products	212	212	291
Agricultural products	348	358	498
Other	27	103	140

Table 23. Georgia: External Trade, 1988, 1989, and 1990
(in millions of rubles)

	1988	1989	1990
Total imports	6,493	6,469	6,839
From other Soviet republics	5,218	4,888	4,948
From other countries	1,275	1,581	1,891

[1] As published.

Source: Based on information from *The Europa World Year Book, 1994*, 1, London, 1994, 1237.

Table 24. Georgia: Major Trading Partners, 1990

Country	Value[1]		Percentage of Total	
	Exports	Imports	Exports	Imports
Europe	213	1,687	71.4	71.2
Austria	6	53	2.0	2.2
Bulgaria	32	202	10.7	8.5
Hungary	18	144	6.0	6.1
Italy	13	53	4.4	2.2
Poland	25	256	8.4	10.8
Germany	32	420	10.7	17.7
Finland	7	76	2.3	3.2
Czechoslovakia	23	227	7.7	9.6
Yugoslavia	8	64	2.7	2.7
Asia	45	377	15.2	15.9
India	6	48	2.0	2.0
China	6	34	1.9	2.7
Syria	1	76	0.2	3.2
Japan	12	115	4.0	4.9
North America	22	192	7.3	8.1
Cuba	16	114	5.4	4.8
United States	3	37	1.0	1.6

[1] In millions of rubles.

Source: Based on information from World Bank, *Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR*, Washington, 1992, 152.

Bibliography

Chapter 1

Aftandilian, Gregory. *Armenia, Vision of a Republic: The Independence Lobby in America.* Boston: Charles River Books, 1981.

Arberry, A.J. (ed.). *Religion in the Middle East, 1.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Arlen, Michael. *Passage to Ararat.* New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1975.

Arpee, Leon. *The Armenian Awakening: A History of the Armenian Church, 1820–1860.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1909.

Aslan, Kevork. *Armenia and the Armenians from the Earliest Times until the Great War (1914).* (Trans., Pierre Crabites.) New York: Macmillan, 1920.

Aspaturian, Vernon V. *The Union Republics in Soviet Diplomacy: A Study of Soviet Federalism in the Service of Soviet Foreign Policy.* Geneva: E. Droz, 1960.

Atamian, Sarkis. *The Armenian Community: The Historical Development of a Social and Ideological Conflict.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1955.

Bardakjian, Kevork B. *The Mekhitarist Contributions to Armenian Culture and Scholarship.* Cambridge: Harvard College Library, 1976.

Bauer-Manndorff, Elisabeth. *Armenia: Past and Present.* Lucerne: Reich Verlag, 1981.

Blackwell, Alice Stone. *Armenian Poetry.* Boston: Atlantic, 1917.

Bournoutian, George A. *Eastern Armenia in the Last Decades of Persian Rule, 1807–1828: A Political and Socioeconomic Study of the Khanate of Erevan on the Eve of the Russian Conquest.* Malibu, California: Undena, 1982.

Braude, Benjamin, and Bernard Lewis. *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire: The Functioning of a Plural Society.* (2 vols.) New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982.

Bryce, James. *Transcaucasia and Ararat.* London: Macmillan, 1896. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1970.

Buxton, Noel, and Harold Buxton. *Travels and Politics in Armenia.* London: Murray, 1914.

Chalabian, Antranig. *General Andranik and the Armenian Revolutionary Movement.* Southfield, Michigan: Chalabian, 1988.

Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 40, October 8, 1993, 35–43.

Davison, Roderic. "The Armenian Crisis, 1912–1914," *American Historical Review*, 53, No. 3, April 1948, 481–505.

———. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.

Dekmejian, R.H. "Soviet-Turkish Relations and Politics in the Armenian SSR," *Soviet Studies*, 19, No. 4, April 1968, 510–25.

de Morgan, Jacques. *History of the Armenian People.* (Trans., Ernest F. Barry.) Boston: Hairenik Press, n.d.

des Pres, Terrence. "On Governing Narratives: The Turkish-Armenian Case," *Yale Review*, 75, Summer 1986, 517–31.

Etmekjian, James. *The French Influence on the Western Armenian Renaissance, 1843–1915.* New York: Twayne, 1964.

Fuller, Elizabeth. "Armenia's Constitutional Debate," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 3, No. 22, May 27, 1994, 6–9.

———. "Paramilitary Forces Dominate Fighting in Transcaucasus," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 25, June 18, 1993, 74–82.

Gidney, James B. *A Mandate for Armenia.* Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1967.

Goshgarian, Geoffrey. "Eghishe Charents and the 'Modernization' of Soviet Armenian Literature," *Armenian Review*, 36, No. 1, 1983, 76–88.

Hartunian, Abraham H. *Neither to Laugh Nor to Weep: A Memoir of the Armenian Genocide.* (Trans., Vartan Hartunian.) Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

Hovannisian, Richard G. *The Armenian Holocaust: A Bibliography Relating to the Deportations, Massacres, and Dispersion of the Armenian People, 1915–1923.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Armenian Heritage Press, 1978.

———. *The Armenian Republic*, 1 and 2. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971 and 1982.

———. "Russian Armenia: A Century of Tsarist Rule," *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas* [Munich], 19, No. 1, 1971, 31–48.

Hovannisian, Richard G. (ed.). *The Armenian Genocide in Perspective.* New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1986.

———. *The Armenian Image in History and Literature.* Malibu, California: Undena Press, 1981.

Hovannisian, Richard G., Stanford J. Shaw, and Ezel Kural.

"Forum: The Armenian Question," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 11, No. 3, August 1979, 379–400.

International Monetary Fund. *Armenia.* (IMF Economic Reviews, 1/1993.) Washington: 1993.

International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1992. (Ed., Jim West.) Tulsa: PennWell, 1992.

Jane's World Railways, 1993–94. (Ed., James Abbott.) Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1993.

Katz, Zev. "The Armenian Church and the WCC: A Personal View," *Ecumenical Review,* 40, July–October 1988, 411–17.

Katz, Zev (ed.). *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

Lang, David Marshall. *Armenia: Cradle of Civilization.* London: Allen and Unwin, 1980.

———. *The Armenians: A People in Exile.* London: Allen and Unwin, 1981.

Lang, David Marshall, and Christopher J. Walker. *The Armenians.* (Minority Rights Group Report No. 32.) London: Minority Rights Group, 1976.

Libaridian, Gerard J. *The Karabagh File: Documents and Facts on the Question of Mountainous Karabagh, 1918–1988.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Zoryan Institute, 1988.

Lloyd's Ports of the World, 1988. (Ed., Paul J. Cuny.) Colchester, United Kingdom: Lloyd's of London, 1988.

Lynch, H.F.B. *Armenia: Travels and Studies.* (2 vols.) Beirut: Khayats, 1965.

Matossian, Mary Kilbourne. *The Impact of Soviet Policies in Armenia.* Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1962.

The Military Balance, 1994–1995. London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

Mirak, Robert. "Armenians." Pages 136–49 in Steven Thernstrom (ed.), *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Nalbandian, Louise. *The Armenian Revolutionary Movement: The Development of Armenian Political Parties Through the Nineteenth Century.* Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963.

National Democratic Movement in Armenia. *Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era.* Watertown, Massachusetts: Blue Crane, 1991.

Noble, John S., and John King. *USSR: A Travel Survival Kit.* Berkeley, California: Lonely Planet, 1993.

Pipes, Richard. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923.* New York: Atheneum, 1968.

Rakowska-Harmstone, Teresa. "The Dialectics of Nationalism in the USSR," *Problems of Communism*, 13, No. 3, 1974, 1–22.

Sarkissian, Karekin. "The Armenian Church." Pages 482–520 in A.J. Arberry (ed.), *Religion in the Middle East*, 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969.

Sarkisyanz, Manuel. *A Modern History of Transcaucasian Armenia: Social, Cultural, and Political.* Leiden, Netherlands: E.J. Brill, 1975.

Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey.* (2 vols.) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

Sheehy, Ann, and Elizabeth Fuller. "Armenia and Armenians in the USSR: Nationality and Language Aspects of the Census of 1979," *Radio Liberty Research Bulletin* [Munich], 24, No. 22, June 13, 1980.

Smith, Anthony D. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations.* Oxford: Blackwell, 1986.

Suny, Ronald G. *Armenia in the Twentieth Century.* Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1983.

———. *The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

———. "Incomplete Revolution: National Movements and the Collapse of the Soviet Empire," *New Left Review*, No. 189, September–October 1991, 111–26.

———. *Looking Toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern History.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.

———. "Nationalism and Democracy in Gorbachev's Soviet Union: The Case of Karabagh," *Michigan Quarterly Review*, 28, No. 4, 481–506.

———. "The Revenge of the Past: Socialism and Ethnic Conflict in Transcaucasia," *New Left Review*, No. 184, November–December 1990, 5–34.

Suny, Ronald G. (ed.). *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.* Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983.

Sutton, Peter. "A View of Soviet Armenia," *Contemporary Review*, No. 246, May 4, 1985, 251–54.

Sweeney, Padraic (ed.). *The Transportation Handbook for Russia and the Former Soviet Union.* Arlington, Virginia: ASET/ICI, 1993.

Ter Minassian, Anahide. *Nationalism and Socialism in the Armenian Revolutionary Movement.* Cambridge, Massachusetts:

Zoryan Institute, 1984.

———. *La République d'Arménie.* Paris: Éditions Complexes, 1989.

Thernstrom, Steven (ed.). *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Thorossian, H. *Histoire de la littérature arménienne: Des origines jusqu'à nos jours.* Paris: n.p., 1951.

Timofeyev, A. *Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union.* Moscow: Progress, 1980.

Toynbee, Arnold J. *Armenian Atrocities: The Murder of a Nation.* London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1915.

Tremlett, P.I. (ed.). *Thomas Cook Overseas Timetable.* Thorpe Wood, United Kingdom: Thomas Cook, 1994.

United States. Agency for International Development. Center for International Health Information. *Armenia: USAID Health Profile.* Arlington, Virginia: 1992.

———. Central Intelligence Agency. *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993.* Washington: GPO, 1993.

———. Central Intelligence Agency. *USSR Energy Atlas.* Washington: 1985.

———. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook, 1994.* Washington: 1994.

———. Department of Commerce. Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States. *Economic Profile of Armenia.* Washington: 1993.

———. Department of State. "Armenia," *U.S. Department of State Dispatch,* 5, May 2, 1994, 255–57.

Walker, Christopher J. "Armenia: A Nation in Asia," *Asian Affairs,* 19, February 1988, 20–35.

———. *Armenia: The Survival of a Nation.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1980.

Walker, Christopher J. (ed.). *Armenia and Karabagh: The Struggle for Unity.* London: Minority Rights Group, 1991.

Woff, Richard. "The Armed Forces of Armenia," *Jane's Intelligence Review* [London], 6, September 1994, 387–91.

World Bank. *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR.* (Studies of Economies in Transformation, Paper No. 1.) Washington: 1992.

———. *Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR.* (Studies of Economies in Transformation, Paper No. 3.) Washington: 1992.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Armenian Assembly of Amer-

ica, *Monthly Digest of News from Armenia*; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia, FBIS Report: Central Eurasia*, and *JPRS Report: Environmental Issues.*)

Chapter 2

Afandiiev, Rasim. *Folk Art of Azerbaijan.* Baku: Ishyg, 1984.

Akiner, Shirin. *Islamic Peoples of the Soviet Union.* (2d ed.) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1986.

Alstadt, Audrey L. "The Azerbaijani Bourgeoisie and the Cultural-Enlightenment Movement in Baku: First Steps Toward Nationalism." In Ronald G. Suny (ed.), *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.* Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983.

———. *The Azerbaijani Turks: Power and Identity under Russian Rule.* Stanford, California: Hoover Institution Press, 1992.

Apostolou, Andrew, Amberin Zaman, and Naritza Matossian. "Central Asia: New Players in an Old Game," *Middle East*, No. 213, July 1992, 5–10.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, and Marie Broxup. *The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State.* London: Croom Helm, 1983.

Bennigsen, Alexandre, Marie Broxup, and S. Enders Wimbush. *Muslims of the Soviet Empire: A Guide.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986.

"Dangerous Liaisons in Transcaucasia," *Intelligence Digest*, February 18, 1994, 3–4.

Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 40, October 8, 1993, 35–43.

Dragadze, Tamara. "Azerbaijanis." Pages 163–79 in Graham Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union.* London: Longman, 1990.

The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1. London: Europa, 1993.

The Europa World Year Book, 1994, 1. London: Europa, 1994.

Fawcett, Louise l'Estrange. *Iran and the Cold War: The Azerbaijan Crisis of 1946.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Frelick, Bill. *Faultlines of Nationality Conflict: Refugees and Displaced Persons from Armenia and Azerbaijan.* Washington: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1994.

Fuller, Elizabeth. "Azerbaijan's June Revolution," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 32, August 13, 1993, 24–29.

———. "Azerbaijan's Relations with Russia and the CIS," *RFE/*

RL Research Report [Munich], 1, No. 43, October 30, 1992, 52–55.

———. "Ethnic Strife Threatens Democratization," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 1, January 1, 1993, 17–24.

———. "The Karabakh Mediation Process: Grachev Versus the CSCE?" *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 3, No. 23, June 10, 1994, 13–17.

———. "Paramilitary Forces Dominate Fighting in Transcaucasus," *RFE/RL Research Report*, 2, No. 25, June 18, 1993, 74–82.

———. "Russia, Turkey, Iran, and the Karabakh Mediation Process," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 3, No. 8, February 25, 1994, 31–36.

Goble, Paul A. "Coping with the Nagorno-Karabakh Crisis," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, 16, Summer 1992, 19–26.

Golden, Peter. "The Turkic Peoples and Transcaucasia." Pages 45–68 in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.* Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983.

Henry, J.D. *Baku: An Eventful History.* London: Constable, 1905. Reprint. New York: Arno Press, 1977.

Hostler, Charles W. *Turkism and the Soviets.* London: Allen and Unwin, 1957.

Huddle, Frank, Jr. "Azerbaidzhan and the Azerbaidzhanis," Pages 189–210 in Zev Katz (ed.), *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

Ibrahimov, Mirza (ed.). *Azerbaijanian Poetry: Classic, Modern, Traditional.* Moscow: Progress, 1969.

International Monetary Fund. *Economic Review: Azerbaijan.* Washington: 1992.

International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1992. (Ed., Jim West.) Tulsa: PennWell, 1992.

Jane's World Railways, 1993–94. (Ed., James Abbott.) Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1993.

Katz, Zev (ed.). *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

Kazemzadeh, Firuz. *The Struggle for Transcaucasia, 1917–1921.* New York: Philosophical Library, 1951.

Lloyd's Ports of the World, 1988. (Ed., Paul J. Cuny.) Colchester, United Kingdom: Lloyd's of London, 1988.

Maggs, William Ward. "Armenia and Azerbaijan: Looking Toward the Middle East," *Current History*, 92, January 1993, 6–11.

The Military Balance, 1994–1995. London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

Nissman, David. "The National Reawakening of Azerbaijan," *World and I,* 7, February 1992, 80–85.

Noble, John S., and John King. *USSR: A Travel Survival Kit.* Berkeley, California: Lonely Planet, 1993.

Pipes, Richard. *The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917–1923.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964.

Richards, Susan. *Epics of Everyday Life: Encounters in a Changing Russia.* New York: Viking Press, 1990.

Saroyan, Mark. "The 'Karabakh Syndrome' and Azerbaijani Politics," *Problems of Communism,* 39, September–October 1990, 14–29.

Sobhani, Sohrab C. "Azerbaijan: A People in Search of Independence," *Global Affairs,* 6, Winter 1991, 40–53.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1994–1995. (Ed., Brian Hunter.) New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Sturino, John. "Nagorno-Karabakh: The Roots of Conflict," *Surviving Together,* 11, Spring 1993, 10–14.

Suny, Ronald G. *The Baku Commune, 1917–1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution.* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972.

Suny, Ronald G. (ed.). *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.* Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983.

Sweeney, Padraic (ed.). *The Transportation Handbook for Russia and the Former Soviet Union.* Arlington, Virginia: ASET/ICI, 1993.

Swietochowski, Tadeusz. "Azerbaijan: Between Ethnic Conflict and Irredentism," *Armenian Review,* 43, Summer–Autumn 1990, 35–49.

———. "National Consciousness and Political Orientations in Azerbaijan, 1905–1920." Pages 209–38 in Ronald G. Suny (ed.), *Transcaucasia: Nationalism and Social Change: Essays in the History of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia.* Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983.

———. *Russian Azerbaijan, 1905–1920: The Shaping of National Identity in a Muslim Community.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

Timofeyev, A. *Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union.* Moscow: Progress, 1980.

Tremlett, P.I. (ed.). *Thomas Cook Overseas Timetable.* Thorpe

Wood, United Kingdom: Thomas Cook, 1994.
United States. Central Intelligence Agency. *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993.* Washington: GPO, 1993.
———. Central Intelligence Agency. *USSR Energy Atlas.* Washington: 1985.
———. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook, 1994.* Washington: 1994.
Weekes, Richard W. (ed.). *The Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey.* (2d ed.) Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984.
World Bank. *Azerbaijan: From Crisis to Sustained Growth.* (A World Bank Country Study.) Washington: 1993.
———. *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR.* (Studies of Economies in Transformation, Paper No. 1.) Washington: 1992.
———. *Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR.* (Studies of Economies in Transformation, Paper No. 3.) Washington: 1992.
Yefendizade, R.M. *Architecture of Soviet Azerbaijan.* Moscow: Stroizdat, 1986.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Central Eurasia* and *FBIS Report: Central Eurasia.*)

Chapter 3

Benet, Sula. *Abkhazians: The Long-Living People of the Caucasus.* New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974.
Bremmer, Ian, and Ray Taras (eds.). *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
Dale, Catherine. "Turmoil in Abkhazia: Russian Responses," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 34, August 27, 1993, 48–57.
Davis, Christopher M. "Health Care Crisis: The Former Soviet Union," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 40, October 8, 1993, 35–43.
Dragadze, Tamara. "Conflict in the Transcaucasus and the Value of Inventory Control," *Jane's Intelligence Review* [London], 6, No. 2, February 1994, 71–73.
The Europa World Year Book, 1993, 1. London: Europa, 1993.
The Europa World Year Book, 1994, 1. London: Europa, 1994.
Fuller, Elizabeth. "Eduard Shevardnadze's Via Dolorosa," *RFE/*

RL Research Report [Munich], 2, No. 43, October 29, 1993, 17–23.

———. "Georgia, Abkhazia, and Chechen-Ingushetia," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 1, No. 5, February 5, 1992, 3–7.

———. "The Georgian Parliamentary Elections," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 1, No. 47, November 27, 1992, 1–4.

———. "Georgia Since Independence: Plus Ça Change . . .," *Current History*, 92, October 1993, 342–46.

———. "Paramilitary Forces Dominate Fighting in Transcaucasus," *RFE/RL Research Report* [Munich], 2, No. 25, June 18, 1993, 74–82.

Holisky, Dee Ann. "The Rules of the *Supra* or How to Drink in Georgian," *Journal for the Study of Caucasia*, 1, No. 1, 1–20.

International Monetary Fund. *Economic Review: Georgia.* Washington: 1992.

International Petroleum Encyclopedia, 1992. (Ed., Jim West.) Tulsa: PennWell, 1992.

Jane's World Railways, 1993–94. (Ed., James Abbott.) Alexandria, Virginia: Jane's Information Group, 1993.

Jones, Stephen. "The Caucasian Mountain Railway Project: A Victory for *Glasnost*?" *Central Asian Survey*, 8, No. 2, 1989, 47–59.

———. "A Failed Democratic Transition." Pages 288–310 in Ian Bremmer and Ray Taras (eds.), *Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

———. "Religion and Nationalism in Soviet Georgia and Armenia." Pages 171–95 in Pedro Ramet (ed.), *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.

Katz, Zev (ed.). *Handbook of Major Soviet Nationalities.* New York: Free Press, 1975.

Lang, David Marshall. *The Georgians.* London: Thames and Hudson, 1966.

———. *A Modern History of Soviet Georgia.* New York: Grove Press, 1962.

Lloyd's Ports of the World, 1988. (Ed., Paul J. Cuny.) Colchester, United Kingdom: Lloyd's of London, 1988.

Mars, Gerald, and Yochanan Altman. "The Cultural Bases of Soviet Georgia's Second Economy," *Soviet Studies*, 35, No. 4, October 1983, 546–60.

The Military Balance, 1994–1995. London: Brassey's for International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994.

Nichol, James. "Georgia in Transition: Context and Implications for U.S. Interests," *Congressional Research Service Report.* (No. 93794.) Washington: Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, August 24, 1993.

Noble, John S., and John King. *USSR: A Travel Survival Kit.* Berkeley, California: Lonely Planet, 1993.

Parsons, Robert. "Georgians." Pages 180–96 in Graham Smith (ed.), *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union.* New York: Longman, 1990.

Ramet, Pedro (ed.). *Religion and Nationalism in Soviet and East European Politics.* Durham: Duke University Press, 1989.

Rosen, Roger. *The Georgian Republic.* Lincolnwood, Illinois: Passport Books, 1992.

Rustaveli, Shota. *The Knight in the Panther's Skin.* (Trans., Venera Urushadze.) Tbilisi: Sabchota Sakartvelo, 1986.

Salia, Kalistrat. *History of the Georgian Nation.* (Trans., Katharine Vivian.) (2d ed.) Paris: Académie Française, 1983.

Sebag-Montefiore, Simon. "Eduard Shevardnadze," *New York Times Magazine,* December 26, 1993, 16–19.

Shevardnadze, Eduard. *The Future Belongs to Freedom.* New York: Free Press, 1991.

Slider, Darrell. "Crisis and Response in Soviet Nationality Policy: The Case of Abkhazia," *Central Asian Survey,* 4, No. 4, 1985, 51–68.

———. "Party-Sponsored Public Opinion Research in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Politics,* 47, No. 1, February 1985, 209–27.

———. "The Politics of Georgia's Independence," *Problems of Communism,* 40, No. 6, November–December 1991, 63–79.

Smith, Graham (ed.). *The Nationalities Question in the Soviet Union.* New York: Longman, 1990.

The Statesman's Year-Book, 1993–1994. (Ed., Brian Hunter.) New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994.

Suny, Ronald G. *The Making of the Georgian Nation.* Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Sweeney, Padraic (ed.). *The Transportation Handbook for Russia and the Former Soviet Union.* Arlington, Virginia: ASET/ICI, 1993.

Timofeyev, A. *Motorist's Guide to the Soviet Union.* Moscow: Progress, 1980.

Tremlett, P.I. (ed.). *Thomas Cook Overseas Timetable.* Thorpe

Wood, United Kingdom: Thomas Cook, 1994.

United States. Central Intelligence Agency. *Handbook of International Economic Statistics, 1993.* Washington: GPO, 1993.

———. Central Intelligence Agency. *USSR Energy Atlas.* Washington: 1985.

———. Central Intelligence Agency. *The World Factbook, 1994.* Washington: 1994.

———. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. *Human Rights and Democratization in the Newly Independent States of the Former Soviet Union.* Washington: 1993.

———. Department of Commerce. Business Information Service for the Newly Independent States. *Georgia.* Washington: 1993.

World Bank. *Food and Agricultural Policy Reforms in the Former USSR.* (Studies of Economies in Transformation, Paper No. 1.) Washington: 1992.

———. *Georgia: A Blueprint for Reforms.* (A World Bank Country Study.) Washington: 1993.

———. *Statistical Handbook: States of the Former USSR.* (Studies of Economies in Transformation, Paper No. 3.) Washington: 1992.

(Various issues of the following periodicals were also used in the preparation of this chapter: Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, *Georgian Chronicle* [Tbilisi]; and Foreign Broadcast Information Service, *Daily Report: Soviet Union, Daily Report: Central Eurasia,* and *FBIS Report: Central Eurasia.*)

Glossary

Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)—Official designation of the former republics of the Soviet Union that remained loosely federated in economic and security matters of common concern after the Soviet Union disbanded as a unified state in 1991. Members in early 1994 were Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan.

Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)—The official name of the communist party in the Soviet Union after 1952. Originally the Bolshevik (majority) faction of a prerevolutionary Russian party, the party was named the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) from 1918 until it was renamed in 1952.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)—Originating in Helsinki in 1975, a grouping of all European nations (the only exception, Albania, joined in 1991) that has sponsored joint sessions and consultations on political issues vital to European security.

Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE Treaty)—An agreement signed in 1990 by the members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact—*q.v.*) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—*q.v.*) to establish parity in conventional weapons between the two organizations from the Atlantic to the Urals. Included a strict system of inspections and information exchange.

coupon—Generic term for bank-issued national currency certificates of Georgia, introduced in early 1993. After introduction, value declined rapidly; in January 1994, the exchange rate was approximately 186,000 coupons per US$1.

dram—National currency of Armenia, officially established for use concurrent with the Russian ruble in November 1993, became single official currency in early 1994. In February 1994, the exchange rate was approximately 15 drams per US$1. A second national unit, the luma (100 to the dram), was introduced in February 1994.

glasnost—Russian term, literally meaning "openness." Applied in the Soviet Union beginning in the mid-1980s to official

permission for public discussion of issues and public access to information. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union.

gross domestic product (GDP)—The total value of goods and services produced exclusively within a nation's domestic economy, in contrast to the gross national product (*q.v.*). Normally computed over one-year periods.

gross national product (GNP)—The total value of goods and services produced within a country's borders and the income received from abroad by residents, minus payments remitted abroad by nonresidents. Normally computed over one-year periods.

International Monetary Fund (IMF)—Established in 1945, a specialized agency affiliated with the United Nations and responsible for stabilizing international exchange rates and payments. Its main business is providing loans to its members when they experience balance of payments difficulties.

Kurds—A mainly Muslim people speaking an Indo-European language similar to Persian. Kurds constitute significant minorities in Iran, Iraq, and Turkey, with smaller groups in Armenia and Syria. Despite international proposals in response to minority persecution, never united in a single state.

manat—National currency of Azerbaijan. Introduced in mid-1992 for use concurrent with the ruble; became sole official currency in January 1994. Classified in 1994 as a "soft" currency, hence nonconvertible.

millet—In the Ottoman Empire, the policy for governance of non-Muslim minorities. The system created autonomous communities ruled by religious leaders responsible to the central government.

net material product (NMP)—In countries having centrally planned economies, the official measure of the value of goods and services produced within the country. Roughly equivalent to the gross national product (*q.v.*), NMP is based on constant prices and does not account for depreciation.

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—During the post-war period until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the primary collective defense agreement of the Western powers against the military presence of the Warsaw Pact (*q.v.*) nations in Europe. Founded 1949. Its mili-

tary and administrative structure remained intact after 1991, but early in 1994 the Partnership for Peace proposed phased membership to all East European nations and many former republics of the Soviet Union.

perestroika—Russian term meaning "restructuring." Applied in the late 1980s to an official Soviet program of revitalization of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU—*q.v.*), the economy, and the society by adjusting economic, social, and political mechanisms in the central planning system. Identified with the tenure of Mikhail S. Gorbachev as leader of the Soviet Union.

Shia—The smaller of the great two divisions of Islam, supporting the claims of Ali to leadership of the Muslim community, in opposition to the Sunni (*q.v.*) view of succession to Muslim leadership—the issue causing the central schism within Islam.

Sunni—The larger of the two fundamental divisions of Islam, opposed to the Shia (*q.v.*) on the issue of succession of Muslim leadership.

value-added tax (VAT)—A tax applied to the additional value created at a given stage of production and calculated as a percentage of the difference between the product value at that stage and the cost of all materials and services purchased or introduced as inputs.

Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army, Air Force, and Navy (DOSAAF)—In the Soviet national defense system, the agency responsible for paramilitary training of youth and reserve components.

Warsaw Pact—Informal name for the Warsaw Treaty Organization, a mutual defense organization founded in 1955. Included the Soviet Union, Albania (which withdrew in 1968), Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic (East Germany), Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The Warsaw Pact enabled the Soviet Union to station troops in the countries of Eastern Europe to oppose the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO—*q.v.*). The pact was the basis for the invasions of Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). Disbanded in July 1991.

World Bank—Informal name for a group of four affiliated international institutions: the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD); the International Development Association(IDA); the International

Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). The four institutions are owned by the governments of the countries that subscribe their capital for credit and investment in developing countries; each institution has a specialized agenda for aiding economic growth in target countries. To participate in the World Bank group, member states must first belong to the International Monetary Fund (IMF—*q.v.*).

Index

Contributors

Glenn E. Curtis is Senior Research Analyst for Eastern Europe and Central Eurasia in the Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

James Nichol is a specialist in the Caucasus and Central Asia for the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress.

Darrell Slider is Associate Professor in the Department of Government and International Affairs, University of South Florida.

Ronald G. Suny is Professor of History and holder of the Armenia Chair at the University of Michigan.

Published Country Studies

(Area Handbook Series)

550–65	Afghanistan
550–98	Albania
550–44	Algeria
550–59	Angola
550–73	Argentina
550–111	Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia
550–169	Australia
550–176	Austria
550–175	Bangladesh
550–170	Belgium
550–66	Bolivia
550–20	Brazil
550–168	Bulgaria
550–61	Burma
550–50	Cambodia
550–166	Cameroon
550–159	Chad
550–77	Chile
550–60	China
550–26	Colombia
550–33	Commonwealth Caribbean, Islands of the
550–91	Congo
550–90	Costa Rica
550–69	Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)
550–152	Cuba
550–22	Cyprus
550–158	Czechoslovakia
550–36	Dominican Republic and Haiti
550–52	Ecuador
550–43	Egypt
550–150	El Salvador
550–28	Ethiopia
550–167	Finland
550–173	Germany, East
550–155	Germany, Fed. Rep. of
550–153	Ghana
550–87	Greece
550–78	Guatemala
550–174	Guinea
550–82	Guyana and Belize
550–151	Honduras
550–165	Hungary
550–21	India
550–154	Indian Ocean
550–39	Indonesia
550–68	Iran
550–31	Iraq
550–25	Israel
550–182	Italy
550–30	Japan
550–34	Jordan
550–56	Kenya
550–81	Korea, North
550–41	Korea, South
550–58	Laos
550–24	Lebanon

550–38	Liberia
550–85	Libya
550–172	Malawi
550–45	Malaysia
550–161	Mauritania
550–79	Mexico
550–76	Mongolia
550–49	Morocco
550–64	Mozambique
550–35	Nepal and Bhutan
550–88	Nicaragua
550–157	Nigeria
550–94	Oceania
550–48	Pakistan
550–46	Panama
550–156	Paraguay
550–185	Persian Gulf States
550–42	Peru
550–72	Philippines
550–162	Poland
550–181	Portugal
550–160	Romania
550–37	Rwanda and Burundi
550–51	Saudi Arabia
550–70	Senegal
550–180	Sierra Leone
550–184	Singapore
550–86	Somalia
550–93	South Africa
550–95	Soviet Union
550–179	Spain
550–96	Sri Lanka
550–27	Sudan
550–47	Syria
550–62	Tanzania
550–53	Thailand
550–89	Tunisia
550–80	Turkey
550–74	Uganda
550–97	Uruguay
550–71	Venezuela
550–32	Vietnam
550–183	Yemens, The
550–99	Yugoslavia
550–67	Zaire
550–75	Zambia
550–171	Zimbabwe